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CHAPTER I
THE

PROBLEI1 AND DE? I NITION OF TERl1S USED

Huey Pierce Long was one of the most flamboyant

.

and controversial political leaders of the early twentieth
century.

Elected. Governor of Louisiana in 1928 on the

platform "Every Man a King," Long soon became nationally
known for his erratic and picturesque behavior as

11

the

Kingfish.n
The New York Times heralded the election of Huey
Long as Governor of the Pelican State as the appearance of
11

a worthy competitor in the field of light political

farce. 111

Later, many persons realized. that the statement

was not entirely accurate.

~ibat

LoUisiana received in

Huey Long was highly political, but it was far from being
light and farcical.
There were laughs, to be sure; Long did. not

11

see any

harm in lightening up the tragedy of politics" with his
burlesque-show antics.

Although he felt that "it cut both

ways, 11 he rationalized that even his critics "wouldn't have
heard. of Huey Long to stab at him if it hadn't been for the
K1ngfish and some tomfoolery.u 2
1

News item in The New ~ Times, January 29, 1928.
2Quoted. 1n Forrest Davis, Huey Long: A Candid
Biography (New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1935), p. 57.

2

As chief executive for the people of Louisiana, Long
flouted the trad.itions of an ordinarily d.ignified. office.
His Excellency conducted. affairs of state from his bedroom
of his suite in Baton Rouge 's Heidelberg Hotel; engaged in
fisticuffs;J and., although

11

not much of a singer, 11 received.

"plenty of encores" as "The Singing Fool" at the Frolics
cabaret in New Orleans' Vieux Carre. 4
Such conduct, however, failed. to "break his power"
and Long, as governor, initiated a legislative program
which marked. a significant departure from Jeffersonian
traditions in the politics of Louisiana.5
I •

Statement

THE PROBLEM

2f the problem. The purpose of this study

was to show the relationship between representative
legislation of the Long administration and. certain social,
economic, and political conditions existing in Louisiana at
that time.

JFrancis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New
York: Alfred. A. Knopf, 1961), p: 545.
----4News item in the New Orleans Times - Picayune, March

30, 1929.
5simkins, 2E•

£11., pp. 544-45.

3

Importance 2!_

~

study.

Much of the Huey Long image

that exists today was created by the press of Louisiana.
Ranging in topic from a lighthearted campaign to determine
the proper etiquette of eating

11

corn pone and pot-likker 116

to a bloody fight in the restroom of a fashionable resort,?
"the Kingfish," with his ungrammatical speech and unpolished.
mannerisms, was

11

good. copy." 8

The major newspapers of Louisiana, the Baton Rouge
State Times, the Times-Picayune,

~

Shreveport Times, and.

the New Orleans Item, as well as the numerous rural weeklies
of the state, were constantly opposed. to long. 9 In the
early months of the Long administration, the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, the most influencial newspaper of the state,
came out in favor of

any properly organized movement to
compel Governor Long to vacate his office.n 10 Editorially,
11

~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, June
26, 1931. Long invited other governors to express their

views on how the

11

d.electable concoction should be eaten."

?News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, August

27, 1933·
8News item in The ~ I2t! Times, January 24, 1928.

9stan Optowsky, The Longs of Louisiana {New York:
E. P. Dutton and. Company,-Inc., 19'00), pp. 2ZI-7-4·9· For

fifteen years Optowsky was a staff reporter for the TimesPicaYl!le•
10News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March
25, 1929.

4
Colonel John E. Ewing , owner-publisher of The Shreveport
Times and. the Baton Rouge State Times , called for Governor
Long to be impeached. . 11 In New Orleans, the press openly
charged. that the Governor was a Hitler of the swamplands , a
Mussolini of the bayous, a d.emagogue, a dictator , and. a man
"tempermentally unfit" to hold. office . 12
These labels , which have survived to the present,
have been re-enforced. by various studies of the Huey Long
governorship drawn, in large part , from newspaper accounts .
Today , therefore , it is customary to dismiss Long as an
"American Fasc1st . n1 3

The epithet , however, is misleading

and. d.oes not offer an explanation to the phenomenon that
was Huey Long .
The Louisiana that witnessed. the inauguration of
Huey Long in 1928 could. hardly be termed. a modern state .
The state highway system had only three major bridges , less
than three hundred. miles of cement highways, and. merely
thirty-five miles of road.ways with asphalt surfacing .

The

11News item in ~Shreveport Times , March 24, 1929.
12
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March
25, 1929 .
l3T . Harry Williams, Romance and. Realism in Southern
Politics (Athens: University of Georgia Press , 1960), p . 73 .

5
state supported educational program , from the elementary
level to the state lmiversity , was inadequate .

The per

cent of illiteracy was more than three times that of the
nation as a whole .

Of its residents over ten years of age ,
13 . 5 per cent were 1.mable to read and write . 14
Thus, for Hamilton Basso , who disagreed with those
who saw Long as a power-mad. d.i c ta tor
to wave aside his road.s , his free schoolbooks , his
schoolbus service , his new schoolhouses, his tax reductions, his debt moratorium , his abolition of the poll
tax, is to wave aside some of the most important reasons
for his continued success . It is to make th~ people of
Louisiana absolute fools and. idiots . After the control
first of the plantations , banking , railroad and utility
interests , then the New Orleans Ring •• i Huey [Long]
came as a welcome , even wholesome relief . 5
II .
The Ring .

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Throughout this study , the term "the New

Orleans Ring" is defined as an unchartered coalition of
Orleans Parish [New Orleans] politicians , industrialists,
and planters who attempted to keep in office men favorable
to Orleans Parish and. their particular interests .

During

14 computed from the United States Bureau of the Census
Fifteenth Census of the United States: 122Q. (Washington:
Government Printing Office , 1935) .
1 5Hamilton Basso , Mainstream (New York : Harcourt, Brace
and Company, 1943) , P • 57 .

6
the first third. of the twentieth century, the mayor of the
Crescent City, Martin Behrman, was the central figure in .
Ring activities.
North and south Louisiana.

The cultural and. religious

contrasts within Louisiana have led. to the frequent
application of the framework "north Louisiana" and "south
Louisiana" to many fields of study.

Fifty-four of the

sixty-four parishes are either more than two-thirds Catholic
or more than two-third.s Protestant,

16

as shown in Figure 1.

Generally speaking neither aggressive Catholicism nor
anticlericalism has been the norm of state politics, but on
occasions religious differences have provided. a foundation
for political d.ivisions. 1 7
III.

DELIMITATION OF STUDY

This study is concerned. with certain political,
social, and. economic activities in Louisiana from !>lay 21,
1928, until January 25, 1932: the Long administration.

16T. Lynn Smith and. Homer L. Nitt, The People of
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1952), P• 327.
17The hypocricy of the upland.er is too much for the
Gallic mind.: "In north Louisiana, 11 as the saying goes, 11 a
wet will vote dry, while in south Louisiana a dry will
vote wet."
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Mention of conditions not included within this period is
mad.e only in ord.er to give a more complete u.nd.erstand ing of
the era .
IV .

SOURCES AND TREATJIIENT OF DATA

The research facilities of the Louisiana State
University in New Orleans , Tulane University, and the

New

Orleans Public Libraries were employed in this stUdy .

In

addition , the private collection of Long material owned
by Harnett T . Kane was consulted. .
In an attempt to give a degree of continuity to the
study, a brief prelude to the Long administration is
given .

It includes a brief sketch of Huey Long ' s background.

and education as well as certain social and political
traditions of Louisiana .
The main bod.y of this study is an analysis of the
governorship of Huey Long .

No attempt was made to classify

Long, nor was a moral judgment made, or implied, concerning
Long's "private" life or his administrative ability.
study was an analysis , not a jud.gment .

The

CHAPTER II
PRELUDE TO THE KINGFISH
The legacy of class conflict in nineteenth-century
Louisiana served as more than a backc1rop for the rise of
Huey Long; traditional class antagonisms comprised. much of
the deep emotional and symbolic content of Longism itself.
I•

RELICS OF POPULISM

The basis of Populist protest in Louisiana stemmed
from the post-Civil War continuation of the plantation
system through the credit devices of the sharecrop and the
crop-lien and. through the absolute increase in both the
number of plantations and the acreage controlled by them. 1
A southern myth has long pictured the Civil War as
breaking up the great plantations and "purging" the South
of all vestiges of planter aristocracy.

In addition,

historians have cited evidence in abundance to certify the
death of the plantation system and the birth of an agrarian
revolution. 2

According to census reports, the number of

1Roger w. Shugg, "Survival of the Plantation System
in Louisiana," Journal of Southern History, II (August,
1937), 311-25.
2

E.g., Charles and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of the
American Civilization (New York: The 1-1acmillan Company,
1927), II, 196; Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele
Commager, The Growth of the American Republic (New York:
Oxford University Fress,-r930), p. 627.

10
11

farms 11 in the South increased from 449,936 in 1860 to

1 , 110 , 294 in 1880 and more than 17 , 430 , 000 acres were ad.d.ed.
to the total acreage of farmland .
size of the average

11

In the same period the

farm" declined from 347 acres to 156

acres . 3
Although considerable redistribution of real estate
ownership did take place , the portioning- out of plantation
lands in small plots among croppers was more a reflection
of the revolution in the methods of labor and. finance than
it was a revolution in land. tenure .

Under the sharecrop

system plots were worked by croppers who shared the prod.uce
with the landlords; but these subdivisions did not change
their ownership .

Each plot worked. by a cropper , however ,

constituted. a separate "farm" within the definition under
which the census marshals worked. .

Thus the perpetuation of

the plantation pattern tended to be obscured .

In Catahoula

Parish , for example , 171 "farms 11 of less than twenty acres
were reported. by census marshals in 1890, although the
local tax assessor could find only nineteen . 4

3

United States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census
of the United. States: 1880 . Statistics of Agriculture , Vol .
III-rwashington : Government Printing Office , 1884), p . 25.

4Roger w. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in

Louisiana, 1880- 1895 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press , 1939), pp . 235-36 .

11
Where the soil was less fertile, in the Florida
Parishes,5 southwestern pine flats, and northern uplands,
the farmers turned to commercial 1 umbering.

Although they

did not stop raising their food and. as much cotton as they
could., they also cut into the timberlands for a

11

cash

crop.u 6
Several northern lumber syndicates entered Louisiana
about 1880 along the railways, purchased large tracts of
public and. private lands, and. cut a wid.e swath through the
forests of the state.

It was a common procedure for these

companies to homestead their employees on public land and
then strip it of timber; in this manner they acqUired.
lumber for less than one-tenth the normal price.
also joined the lucrative business.

Railroads

The Texas and. Pacific

"backbone grant" up the Red. River, through the center
of the oak and. long-leaf pine forests, aroused. local
Populism by dispossession of squatters and farmers.
The lumber companies received. most of the timber.

The

5The five northeastern parishes of Louisiana,
between the Mississippi and Pearl rivers, are called the
Florida parishes because Spain retained. them as part of
West F lorida when retroceding Louisiana to France in 1800.
They became part of the United. States by insurrection in
1810.
6Shugg, .Ql?.. ill• , p. 268.

12
extent of their operation may be judged. by the situation in
Rapides Parish, where there were fifteen sawmills in 1886;
the largest one, owned by a New York syndicate, turned out
250,000 board feet per d.ay. 7
By the end. of the nineteenth century it was apparent
that the farmers of Louisiana had become d.eeply involved in
the commercial "cotton and. cawn" economy.

The acreage

planted in cotton was greater than that alloted. to corn,
and the cultivation of either occupied more acres than any
8
other crop.
The specialization in cotton was accompanied. by the
growth of tenancy.

To grow cotton at all, the poorer

farmers had to go into d.ebt for "seed. and furnish;tt and the
larger the d.ebt grew, the greater the amount of cotton they
attempted to grow.
In 1894, after three d.ecad.es of decline, cotton
prices bottomed at 4 .J cents per pound..

The damage to crops

by the flood.ing Mississippi and Red rivers in 1891-92 and.
the Credit Panic of 1893 additionally depressed the agri-

7shugg, 2-E·

ill·.

p. 269.

8 united States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census
of the United. States: 1880. Reports on Cotton Production,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884), P•

vo1:-v
67.

13
cultural economy.9

It was the combined impact of these

economic pressures which drove the farmers to seek redress
through politics.
Farmer agitation in Louisiana up to the 1890's had.
limited itself to working within the Democratic party.

The

willingness of Democrats to agree to agrarian demands was
tempered by their convictions that farmers would not d.o any
thing to endanger the maintenance of white supremacy.
Continued Democratic rejection of farmer proposals, however,
served. to move more aggressive farmers toward third-party
activities.
In the Congressional election of 1890, farmers in
the Fourth Congressional District, taking in nearly all of
north-central and. northwestern Louisiana, countered the
Democratic maneuvering by holding a rump convention in
Natchitoches.

Although the farmers' candidate was d.efeated.

in 1890, within two years the farmers of Louisiana were
organized in the Populist party.10
The normal tactic of Louisiana Populists, similar to
the agrarian protest in other southern states, was to ally

9Melvin J. White, "Populism in Louisiana During the
Nineties, 11 The IUssissippi Valley Historical Review, V
(June, 1918},4.
10
Ibid.., PP• 7-8, 11.

14
with the other minority party.

In the Pelican State the

Populists• "great stronghold" was in the hill parishes of
the northwest, peopled mainly by small white farmers .
The movement

11

never gained much of a foothold. in the cotton

parishes of the delta , or in the sugar parishes, and was
never strong in the cities . n11
The election of 1892 provided no reflection of the
state's farmer influence because the dominant issue was the
fate of the Louisiana Lottery Company .

The topic so

divided the Democratic party that one pro-Lottery Democrat
and one anti-Lottery Democrat ran in the general election.
In addition , farmer delegates from the Florida parishes and
southwestern and northern Louisiana put forward an independent Populist ticket .

The Populist made a poor showing

and. carried only the parishes of Catahoula, Vernon , Winn,
and. Grant . 12
The scene was set for a widespread revolt against
the Democratic party by the time of the state election of
1896.

The severe droughts of 1895 which affected. the

farmers of southwest and. north Louisiana intensified. farmer
11

Ibid ., PP • 14-15 .
12 Berthold c. Alwes , "The History of the Louisiana
State Lottery Company , " Louisiana Historical Quarterly
XXVII (October , 1944), 964-1118 .

15
discontent.

In the Crescent City, New Orleans reformers

entered a candidate for mayor against the nominee of the
city machine.

And in the sugar bowl region, planters,

fearing Grover Cleveland. 1 s tariff policies, aligned with
the Republicans .
After consid.erable friction, the Populists, sugar
planters, and Republicans settled on a state slate headed
by gubernatorial candid.ate John Pharr, a Republican sugar
planter from St. Mary Parish.

The Democrats nominated

Governor Murphy J. Foster, the anti-Lottery candidate in
1892, for re-election on a platform which avoided issues of
13
concern to farmers.
The areas of the state most hostile to and most
receptive to the Populists are shown in Figure 2.

The

stronghold.s of the agrarian protest were the north-central
uplands and the Florida parishes.

The spread of small

farmers into the southwestern part of the state and into
the second tier of parishes bordering on the northeastern
Delta parishes explained Populist appeal in those areas.
Anti-Populist areas included the planter parishes of the
Bed River and Mississippi River deltas, the Felicianas, and
13Lena M. Vegas, "The Populist Party in Louisiana"
(unpublished. Master's thesis, Tulane University, New
Orleans, 1942), pp. 97-103, 113.
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17
the parishes containing the urban centers of Shreveport,
Monroe , Alexandria , and New Orleans .
Although the parish-vote patterns revealed for the
election of 1896 are shaded. by some deviations , it may be
generally presumed that Populism brought to a peak the
expression of class antagonisms in Louisiana .

The develop-

ment of observable differences in the planter- farmer and the
rural-urban voting behavior is particularly noteworthy
since these elements are essential to the und.erstand.ing of
the patterns of support for and. opposition to Huey Long in
the gubernatorial elections of 1924 and 1928 and the 1930
Congressional election .
The Democrats of the Pelican State were sufficiently
impressed. by the Populist showing to grant significant
concessions to them in preparation for the presidential
election of 1896 .

The Democrats formally allied with the

Populists , giving them one-half the electors and enabling
them to support Tom Watson for vice-president on the Bryan
ticket .

Although Populist leaders predicted that the fate

of their party would. be enhanced by the fusion , the 1896
presid.ent!al election marked. the decline of Populism as a
separate party in Louisiana .

In the twentieth century , no

Populist leader was to enter either a Congressional or a
state race .

18
The new willingness of Democrats to pen agrarian
reforms into the Louisiana Constitution of 1898 was one
factor in the rapid decline of the Populist party.

The

document created, among other things, a State Board of
Appraisers to assess utility companies, agencies to regulate
banks and railroads, and a State Board of Agriculture and
Immigration.

The new Constitution also brought about, to

the applause of both Democrats and Populists, the effective
disfranchisement of the Negro .
By the start of the twentieth century, Louisiana had.
seemingly achieved. class harmony within one big party,
unified by considerations of race.
Negro was politically sterile .

Populism was dead.

The

The situation gave rise to

a number of interrelated. consequences, including a dulling
of issues, d.eclining voter turnouts, and continued control
of the party by the same inner clique.
II.

THE NEW ORLEANS RING

The Choctaw Club of New Orleans, since its formation
in 1897, has been an organization of professional politicians seeking to maintain control of the Orleans Parish
government.

Known more commonly as the

11

ring, 11 the

"Choctaws," or, after a factional riff in the early 1920's,
as the "old regulars, 11 this organization has constituted.

19
a Democratic machine similar in objective and. method.s to
the city machines in various non- southern states .

A study

of the operation of the New Orleans Ring in LoUisiana politics is not a direct concern of this investigation and., in
ad.di tion, has alread.y been successfully undertaken . 14
Of
greater significance here is the presentation of material
which demonstrates how the New Orleans Ring became the
controlling force in Louisiana politics and the consequences
for public policy of that control .
The primacy of the Crescent City in state politics
was the natural outcome of its number of voters and. its
share of seats in the Legislature and. in the state central
committee of the Democratic party.l5

In state primary

elections the New Orleans vote constituted over one-fifth
of the state vote.

Und.er the Constitution of 1898, Orleans

was alloted. twenty of the one-hund.red. representatives and
eight of thirty-nine Senators .

A similar proportion of the

state central committee of the Democratic party was granted
to New Orleans .

The city of New Orleans , therefore , could

14This evaluation of the New Orleans Ring relies
heavily on George M. Reynolds , Machine Politics in New
Orleans (New York : Columbia University Press, 19~):-15The city of New Orleans is co-extensive with the
Parish of Orleans . The Commission Council was the governing bod.y of both and was , therefore, both a state and a
municipal agent for all purposes of local government .

20

be the decisive factor in the election of state officials,
the referenda of amend.ments to the Constitution, passage
of legislation, and. in shaping party rules • 1 6
The Ring's superior position in Louisiana politics
was the natural outgrowth of Orleans Parish 1 s d.epend.ence
upon and vulnerability to the governor and the Legislature.
Following the pattern set by the 1879 Constitution, the
Constitutions of 1898 and 1921 were miserly in their
grants of po1-1er to parish and city governments .

Local

issues were, consequently, cast into state politics.

Thus,

to maintain their position in city politics the Ring was
forced to concern itself with the election of friendly or
at least nonbelligerent governors and Solons.17
The emergence of the Ring in state politics add.ed
the one-sided elements of that strong organization to the
one-party system and. swelled the Ring's influence within
the state.

The common tactic of

11

back-scratching11 t>Tas

often employed by the Ring to develop a rural-parish vote
to back its own bills.

The Ring would back certain rural-

parish measures not affecting Orleans Parish interests in
16
Reynold.s , .Q.E.• cit., pp . 19-21.
17
Ibid., pp. 23-41.

21
order to secure adequate backing for its measures.

Rural

Solons, in order to gain Ring favor, often exempted Orleans
from coverage by amending their bills with what came to be
a common phrase in the LoUisiana Legislature, "parish of
Orleans exceptea..n 18
Asid.e from directing the operations of the Crescent
City's legislative delegation, the Ring backed slates of
cand.idates in all elections of interest to the voters of
New Orleans.

The organization never openly enrolled a

gubernatorial aspirant of its own or endorsed. one early in
a campaign.

Usually, after a period of careful study, the

Ring would quietly secure the necessary

11

und.erstand.ings"

with the candidate who was not hostile to it and seemed
to have the best prospects of carrying a plurality of votes
in the rural parishes. 1 9 After making these "arrangements, 11
the Ring would. publicly voice its sponsorship, occasionlly
as late as the night before the election. 20
Oil eventually dwarfed the gas and. electric, lumber,
planter, and. railroad. factions which constituted. a large

18
19
20

Ibid.., PP• 38-39·

I.E.!£·.

p. 40.

T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern
Politics (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1901), p. 67.

22
segment of the New Orleans Ring .

Accordingly , in the early

1920 1 s the Stand.ard. Oil Company became a major political
and economic factor in Lou1siana . 21
The Ring and Standard Oil Company usually emerged as
the victors in the running battle between New Orleans and
the rural parishes . 22 Ring rule moved Louisiana into a
civic vacuum and the "safe" policies of the organization
developed a reservoir of dissatisfaction from which Huey
Long was to later dxaw much support . 2 3
21

Ibid.•
22
From 1900 to 1924 , the Ring backed the successful
gubernatorial candid.acies of Heard , Blanchard , Sand.ers,
Pleasant, and Fuqua .

23

Cf ., V. O. Key , Jr ., Southern Politics in State

~Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 1961) , pp:-159-60 .

CHAPTER III
THE FLEDGLING KINGFISH
There is an obvious relationship between Huey Long's
environment and. his political philosophy.

The program that

he advocated. was, in many respects, a twentieth century
version of traditional Louisiana Populism. 1 However, it
is of significance that during his entire political career
he never seriously mentioned the two great southern
legends: the Old South and the Lost Cause.

In an era when

many politicians attempted to recall the images of past
glories, Huey Long spoke of the economic realities of the
present and. the future. 2
Huey Pierce Long, Jr., was born on August 30, 1893,
in a "comfortable, well-built, four-room log house," the
eighth of nine children, in the small town of Winnfield,
Winn Parish, in north-central Louisiana.3

Huey's father

cultivated a portion of a 320 acre tract of soil suitable
1

v. o. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and
Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950},
157. ---

P:

2

T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern
Politics (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961}, pp.

68-69.

3auey P. Long, Every ~ ~ King: The Autobiography
2f Huey P. Long (New Orleans: National Book Company, 1933),
P• 2.
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only for subsistence farming , though it was in danger of a
second. growth of loblolly pine .

Winn Parish was mean poor

and populated. mainly by Protestant small farmers .

Social

opportunities , according to Long, were largely limited to
participation in Baptist revivals and
funeral within ten miles . u4

11

attending every

In 1900 , the Arkansas Southern Railroad. constructed.
a small lumber line from El Dorado , Arkansas , to Winnfield
and located the depot on the Long farm .

The temporary

prosperity of the sawmills soon brought other lines into
the area, swelling the population of Winnfield. to almost
three thousand persons .

One sid.e of the Long tract became

the site of the business district and another portion was
developed into a residential area .
There is a myth about the background of Huey Long
that tints almost everything that has been written about
him .

That myth pictures him as a

11

red.neck," without

ed.ucation or culture; in the language of the South,
trash . 11 5

11

whi te

The Longs were , however, highly respectful of

ed.ucation and. eager to acquire it .

With the financial

security brought by land. sales, each of the Long children
4

Ibid ., PP • 6-7 •

5Williams, 2E• cit . , p . 68 .
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was able to acquire at least a sampling of college life .

6

After completion of high school , the young Kingfish
traveled through north Louisiana selling Cottolene, a lard
substitute for kitchen use .

The ambitious young politico

never stayed in hotels while on selling trips .

Long said:

I always drove out beyond. town to a farmhouse where
they 1 d. put me up • • • and later I would. make it my
business to drop those folks a post card so they'd be
sure to remember me . 7
After sales positions in Kansas City, Houston,
Memphis , and Oklahoma City, Long enrolled in the Oklahoma
State University Law School in 1912.
only for its political turbulence .

His stay was notable
Flouting a campus-

organized Wilson-for-President Club, Long announced in
favor of Champ Clark and staged a walkout when the original
club held its meeting .
endorsed Clark.

Long's organization unanimously

As a result of this mild adventure , Long

d.eveloped. a tactic he would later employ for higher stakes .
His dictum: "In a political fight, when you have nothing
in favor of your sid.e, start a row in the opposi tion . n8

6
The Long family produced. three d.octors and two
lawyers .
7Quoted. by Hermann B. Deutsch, The Huey Long
Murder Case (Garden City, New York: Doubled.ay and Company,
Inc . , 1903), p . 14 .
8
Quoted in Thomas Martin , Dynasty: The yongs of
Louisiana (New York: G. P. Putnam ' s Sons, 1960 , p. 27.
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In 1914 Huey married. Rose McConnell of Shreveport.
The couple settled in a two-room apartment in New Orleans
and. in October of that year the young bridegroom entered.
Tulane University as a student of law.

Huey was faced.

with the alternative of becoming a lawyer very qUickly or
of abandoning the effort entirely when his finances ran
low in the late months of spring.

However, he petitioned

Chief Justice Frank A. Monroe of the Louisiana Supreme
Court to assemble the majority of the Court necessary to
give the qualifying examination.

On May 15, 1915, Huey

Long, at twenty-one, was licensed. to practice law.9
A few days after passing the bar examination, Long
returned. to Winnfield to a four-dollar-a-month rented. office
to begin practice.

The clients, though, were few and. the

first month's rent was paid. with a

11

hot 11 check.

Slowly

the clients drifted in and Huey developed what he called
a

11

chip and whetstone" practice. 10
Most of the early cases came from the railroad

yards--workmen's compensation and injury suits.

But Huey's

first major political contact came when a widow asked him
to sue the Bank of Winnfield. for money she thought that

9Long, 22• cit., pp. 9-17.
10

Ibid., p. 22.
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the bank owed her.

Although neither he nor the widow had

the one hundred dollars for the required legal bond, Huey
took the case.

With characteristic swagger Huey went to

the bank, sought out one of the d.irectors, State Senator
J, S. Harper, and. persuaded him to post the necessary
bond so that the bank could be sued.• 11
A few months after the d.eclaration of war with
Germany, the same Senator Harper published a pamphlet,
"Issues of the Day--Freed.om of Speech--Financial Slavery, 11
in which he advocated the taxing of wealth for war costs
instead. of issuing bonds.

In the first month of 1918, a

Fed.eral Grand Jury in Alexandria, Louisiana, issued. an
indictment against Harper for violation of the Espionage
Act.
The attorneys for the d.efense were the brothers Huey
and Julius Long.

During the course of the trial, in a

New Orleans Times-Picayune interview, Huey revealed. his
careful examination and acceptance of the Harper thesis.
The case dragged. to tiresome lengths, but upon the close
of evidence, Julius Long presented. a well-constructed.
argument for the defense and. the Senator was acqui ted..
11

Ibid., PP•

23-25.

12News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
February 22, 1918.

12

The Harper trial catapulted twenty-four year old
Huey P. Long into the Louisiana limelight.
the New Orleans

~.
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In a letter to

a few days after the trial, Huey set

forth to the people of the Pelican State the earliest
indication of his political philosophy:
A conservative estimate is that about sixty-five or
seventy per cent of the entire wealth of the United
States is owned by two per cent of the people. Sixtyeight per cent of the whole people living in the United
States own but two per cent of its wealth. From the
year 1890 to 1910, the wealth of this nation trebled,
yet the masses owned less in 1910 than they did. in 1890
and a greater per cent of the people lived. in rented
and mortgaged homes in 1910 than did in 1900. Reports
from the Committee of Industral Relations, appointed
by the Presiclent [Wilson], showed that wealth 1s fast
concentrating in the hand.s of a few.
But the greatest cause for industrial unrest is that
of education. Authorities on education tell us that
eighty out of every one hund.red. people in the United.
States never enter high school; only fourteen out of
every thousand gets a college education; 690 out of
every thousand never finish the fourth grade in school.
Does such a condition give~e ordinary man hls proper
return of the nation's wealth? What d.o you think
of such a game of life so brutally and cruelly unfair,
with the dice so loaded that the child of tod.ay must
enter it with only fourteen chances out of a thousand
in his favor of getting a college education and. with
986 chances against securing the lucky d~aw? How can
this nation prosper with the ord.inary child having only
twenty chances in a thousand. of securing the first part
of the game?
This is the condition, north east, south, and west;
with wealth concentrating, classes becoming defined.,
there is little opportunity for Christian uplift and.
education and. cannot be until there is more economic
reform. This is the problem that the good people of

29
this country must consider. 1 3
At twenty-four, Huey Long possessed a political
platform.

Without serious modification, but with sophis-

ticated enlargements, the creeds of "Every Man a King" and.
"Share Our Wealth" were roughly outlined in his letter on
the concentration of wealth.
Long sought the one state office then open to one of
his age and north LoUisiana residence: Third District
Railroad Commissioner. 14 As a political unknown, Long had
few supporters and little influence, and competed with
three others in an attempt to unseat the popular incumbent,
Burk A. Bridges, who was running for re-election.
The campaign the fledgling Kingfish waged for the
seat on the Commission, in the summer of 1918, set the
pattern for Long's future campaigns.

From his headquarters

in Shreveport, Long mailed thousands of envelopes, each
containing four circulars, to almost every voter in the
Third District.

They were, naturally, partisan and slanted.,

but they were lengthy compositions--an average product ran
from 1, 000 to 1, 800 words--and. they were packed with

l3Letter to the F.Cli tor in the New Orleans Item,
March 1, 1918.
---14The Constitution of 1898 prescribed no minimum
age qualification for the office of Railroad. Commissioner.
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political and economic information . 1 5
Instead of aping the

11

rednecks" by wearing overalls

and. riding in a wagon , Long , d.ressed in a smart business
suit and driving an automobile , stumpted in areas long
ignored. by office- seekers .

Accustomed. to recounts of the

Old South and. the Lost Cause , the farmers of the Third.
District were confronted. with a man who told. them to fight
for what they wanted. .

Long later recalled.:

I canvassed the farmers in person and spent most of
my time at night tacking up my campaign posters in the
neighborhood being canvassed . Occasionally, so intense
was my campaign, I called people from their beds at all
hours of the night to talk politics .
Nothing in my campaign seemed to please farmers more
or cause them to recollect me near1! so favorably as to
call them from their beds at night . 6
Long secured. 55', 515 votes to Bridges 1 6 , 979 votes in
the first primary and. attracted a majority of the votes in
eight of the twenty-eight parishes in the district .

In the

runoff , Huey won by 635 votes (7 , 286 to 6,651) .
The six-year office gave Long a respectable platform
from which to launch his program .

He bombarded friends and.

the newspapers with circulars which outlined in d.etail the
injustices in the state's handling of corporate interests ,
1 5The best collection of Long material is in the
Tulane University Library in New Orleans , LoUisiana .
16
Long , 2R• cit . , pp . 40-~·1 .
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in particular, Standard Oi1 Company, the dominant vested
interest in the state.
Standard Oi1 had S1lmmari1y moved to put more than
one hundred independent oil companies out of business by
d.enying them the use of the Standard-owned pipelines,
necessary to carry their crude oil from the field to the
refineries.

Long countered with an ingenuity and initiative

characteristic of his entire public career.

He persuaded

Shelby M. Taylor, Chairman of the Railroad Commission, to
endorse his view that pipelines were common carriers and,
therefore, subject to regulation by the Commission.

The

attempt by Standard Oil to have the ruling reversed by the
courts was tmsuccessfu1. 1 7
Having secured statewid.e fame through his tilts
with Standard Oil and Governor Parker, 1 8 Huey further
enhanced his politically useful record with a series of
successful rate cases. The Public Service Commission, 1 9
1 7Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Standard
Q!! Companies Qf Louisiana, 154 Louisiana Reports, P• 557•
l8A public statement reflecting unmistakably on the
Governor's ancestry resulted in a libel suit against Long.
Huey received. a suspended sentence and a one dollar fine.
Long refused to pay the fine.
1 9The Constitution of 1921 created the Public
Service Commission to replace the Railroad Commission in
regulation of public utilities.
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as a result of hearings held. in 1920-21, had granted the
Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company a twenty per
cent rate increase.

In 1922, Huey Long, then Chairman of
the Public Service Commission, 20 reopened the case. The

rates were eventually lowered., and since the red.uctions
1·1ere made retroactive to the time of Cumberland 1 s 1920
application for increase, a huge reftmd. was assured. to all
telephone subscribers. 21 Overnight the Kingfish was a
state hero.

He scored on other fronts as well, lowering

the rates on the Southwestern Gas and. Electric Company,
of all intrastate railroads, and. of the Shreveport streetcars. 22
By the election year of 192.3, Huey Long was a
personal force in state politics, assured of support if
he should decide to "make the race for governor. 112.3
On
20 In November of 1921., Chairman John Hichael died.,
and. Francis vl1lliams was elected to succeed him. Huey
Long became chairman in 1922.
21
Cumberland Telephone and Tele~raph Company v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission, 2 .3 Federal Reporter,
p. 265: Cumberland. Telephone and. Telegraph Company v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission , 260 u. s. 212 .
22
Huey P . Long v . Ci t;y s>J.'. Shreveport anc1. Shreveport
Railroad Company, 151 Louisiana Reports , p . 42).
2
.3News item in the New Orleans Item-Tribune,
January 6, 192.3.
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his thirtieth birthd.ay, 24 following eight months of vague
utterances, Long dispelled all doubts when he filed. for the
highest elective state office. 2 5 In a speech delivered. in
Shreveport, Huey set forth a broad. program: a vast highway
construction program, the establishment of criminal courts
of appeal, state warehouses for farm produce, natural gas
for New Orleans, an increase in the number of schools, state
supplied. textbooks, 26 and. the taxation of Stand.ard 011 on a
2
one-hundred-cent dollar. 7
In terms of organization and political support Huey
placed a poor third. behind. his two rivals in the campaign
of 1924.

Henry L. Fuqua, the former manager of Angola

State Penitentiary, was backed by the "old." Ring, the Ku
Klux Klan, and. former Governor J. Y. Sanders.

Fiercely

anti-Klan, Hewitt L. Bouanchard., the Catholic LieutenantGovernor under Parker, was supported by the Times-Picayune
and. the Crescent City's

11

new11 Ring , a splinter group

2l~

Under the Constitution of 1921, thirty was the
minimum age for a gubernatorial cand.id.ate.
2
5News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 31, 1923.

26

News item in the Shreveport Times, September 2,

1923.

27

Nel'lS items in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
September 7, 8, 19; and. December 19, 1923.

34
backeo. by Colonel John Sullivan , Colonel John Ewing , the
publisher of the Shreveport Times , and his son Robert ,
publisher of the Baton Rouge States .
The campaign took on a strange appearance in October
of 1923 when the Governor voiced his support of the Catholic
Bouanchaud , stating that the "great issue is Klan and antiKlan.n 28 Long , who claimed membership only in the Elks, 2 9
appealed to the voters to ignore the religious issues and
continued to speak for those things he considereo. to be
paramotm.t. 30 However, the south LoUisiana vote appeared
lost l'lhen Swords R. Lee , a prominent Klan leader , spoke
out in favor of his nephew--Huey Long . 31
Huey , in the tradition of politics , forecasted
victory, barring rain , which would
voters .

11

mud- out 11 his backwoods

He realized , however , that the state was divideo.

by a religious conflict which left him out of the running
28

News items in the Nel'1 Orleans Times - Picayune ,
October 28 ana 30 , 1923 .
2 9Nel'lS item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune ,
August 31 , 1923 .
30
News items in the New Orleans Times- Picayune ,
September 7, 18 , 19; October 6; and. December 19 , 1923 .
31News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
December 19, 1923 .
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in many places.3 2
The January primary placed Fuqua and Bouanchaud in
the runoff, as shown in these results: 33
Orleans

Other

State

%State

Long

12,187

61,798

73.985

30.9

Fuqua

33,194

48,188

81,382

34.0

Bouanchaud

23,300

60,862

84,162

35.1

Total

68,681

170,848

239.329

"On the night preced.ing the election, a heavy downpour of rain fell in every part of the state.u34 Huey's
defeat, however, was not caused only, or even mainly, by
muddy roads.35

Huey , a Baptist uplander, from the region

of greatest Klan power, had attempted to straddle the
issue and thereby gained the judgment of many that he was
a Klan candid.ate.

32wng, .Q.E •

In the first primary a d.istinct sectional

ill•,

P • 77 •

33computed from Compilation 2! Primary Election
Returns of the Democratic Party, State of Louisiana, held
January 13,"'"'1924.
J4Long, ~· cit., pp. 77-78.
35c.r., stan Optowsky, The Longs of LoUisiana (New
York: E. P. Dutton and Company:-Inc., 19bO}, p. 41; and.
Reinhard B. Luthin, American Demagogues: Twentieth Century
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, l959), P• 244.

voting pattern was evid.ent .

Basically, south Louisiana

had voted for the Catholic Bouanchaud , while Long and. Fuqua
had. fought for north Louisiana and. the Florida parishes .
For the most part , the state vote- pattern did not repeat
that of 1896, nor did. it forecast the Long victory of 1928 .
The basic reasons for Huey ' s defeat , therefore , lay in the
realm of religion , rather than class , issues in the
campaign , together with the fact that two Protestants were
running against one Catholic . 3 6 It was only due to Fuqua 's
strength in New Orleans [Orleans Parish] that he, instead.
of Long was in the runoff .
In the runoff held February 19 , 1923 , although Long
refused. to endorse either candidate , the bulk of his rural
vote went to Fuqua , who received. 57 .8 per cent of the total
vote cast . 37
The lesson of the 192l.J· campaign was obvious to Long
and. the array of opportunists who came over to his side
d.uring the next three years .

If he could keep the north

LoUisiana hill-parish following and. make alliances in the
Crescent City and. south LoUisiana , his election in 1928
36I1artin ,

.Ql?..

cit . , p . l.J.o.

37computed. from Compilation of Primary Election
Returns of the Democratic Party, State of Louisiana , held.
February1'9:-I92Lt. .
-

37
would. be guaranteea. . 3 8
Long

~Tas

renominated as Third District member of the

Public Service Commission in September, 1924 .

He polled

83 . 9 per cent of the total vote cast and carried all twentyeight of the parishes in that north Louisiana district .

In

the same primary , Huey supported. the renomination of United
States Senator Joseph E. Ransd.ell , a south Louisiana
Catholic , l'Tho d.efeated. L . E. Thomas , Mayor of Shreveport .
In the New Orleans mayorality primary of 1925 , Huey joined.
the Colonel Sullivan ' s

11

nel'T 11 Ring in support of Paul H.

Haloney against Hartin Behrman. 39

Perceptive Behrmanites

charged. that Maloney was being backed.
governor in 1928 . .. 40

11

to make Huey Long

Long's chance to l'Tin converts in the south came in
the 1926 Senatorial campaign when he backed. the incumbent ,
a south Louisiana Catholic

11

wet , 11 Edwin

s.

Broussard .

The

3 8Leo Glenn Douthit , "The Governorship of Huey P.
Long" (unpublished Master ' s thesis , Tulane University , New
Orleans , 19L~7) , p . 37 .
3911artin Berhman, mayor of New Orleans for twentyfour years , died shortly after taking office , in 1925, and.
~ras succeed. by Maloney .
40
Hermann B. Deutsch , "The Kingoom of the Kingfish ,"
New Orleans Item , August 6 , 1939 .

38
Senator was opposed by a Ring41

11

l'Tarhorse , " Jared. Y.

Sanders, an east Louisiana Protestant 11 dry, 11 with reputed.
42
strength in north Louisiana .
For twenty- one days Long
stumpted in all parts of the state for " Cousin Ed., 11 making
four to six speeches per d.ay .

To keep from alienating his

own upland supporters , Huey ducked. the prohibition question
and. centered his attack on Sander 1 s advocacy of toll bridges
for the New Orleans area . 4 3 The Senator was re- elected. by
44
a slender margin , and Huey claimed credit for saving the
45
Broussard. election .
However , it was the narrowness of the
victory , rather than the high degree of support accorded him
by those north Louisiana parishes loyal to Long in 1924 ,
that allowed Huey to accent his contributuion to the: outcome.
41
The Ri ng was avidly "wet . 11 News item in the New
Orleans Times - Picayune , August 9, 1926 .
4·2
Long, QE• cit ., p . 82 .
4 3sanders had supported Act 1h1 of 1924 which adopted.
a toll bridge policy for the state highway system. On
Febr~~y 26 , 1925 , in negotiations between the Highway
Commission and. the Pontchartrain Bridge Company , to whom the
franchise was granted. , the company was represented by Jared.
Y. Sanders .
44
The official returns showed Broussard l'ri th 84·, 041
votes and. Sanders with 80 , 562 .
4·5
Long , QE• cit ., p . 83 .

•
39
\'lhile Long worked to extend. his influence by his own
efforts, the Fuqua administration indirectly helped his
chances for the 1928 gubernatorial election.

By enacting

three anti-Klan measures, the Louisiana Legislature put an
end to the religious issues which confined. Long's appeal
to north Louisiana in 1924·.

On the other hand., Governor

Henry Fuqua died on October 11, 1929, a short time after
the Senatorial campaigns.
Governor

o.

He was succeeded. by Lieutenant-

H. Simpson, who had also supported the re-

election of Broussard .

Shortly after assuming office,

Simpson, who had gubernatorial ambitions which rivaled those
of Huey , stole Long's thunder when he announced. a freebridge policy and let contracts for the construction of
46
piers upon which free bridges could be rested .
In the 1928 gubernatorial campaign, neither of Long's
two opponents, singly , represented. a threat to the
Kingfish's chances of victory.

Governor Simpson was the

first to announce his entrance into the gubernatorial
race. 4 7 Two days later, Congressman Riley J. Wilson ,
poll tical ally of former Governor Jared. Y. Sanders, was

46
Long, 2E• cit., PP • 90-93·
47
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
July 6, 1927.

I

40

nominated. at an Alexandria political rally . 4 8
The main concern to the Kingfish was the likelihood.
that his opponents would. join forces s o that , if he failed.
to secure a majority over both in the first primary, "common
cause would. be made by both the Wilson and. Simpson forces
behind. whichever cand.id.ate was in the second. contest .u 4 9
To counter the threat of this alliance , Huey employed. his
11

start a row in the opposition" tactic .

As Long record.ed.

in his autobiography , he found.
some traitor in our camp who was willing to go to the
Simpson crowd. and. ad.vise them that this other gang
[Wilson] was working to ruin their cand.id.ate .50
The tactic was employed. so effectively that any
possibility of co -operation between his rivals was not
likely .

Long poured all the oil on the fire that he could ,
w·ith excellent results . 51 He d.ismissed. ~lilson's 11 flood
record 11 with rid.icule :

11

Wilson has been in the Congress

fourteen years , and this year [1927] the water went
fourteen feet higher than ever , 11 which , according to
Kingfish Long , gave him a flood record. on the basis of one

48

News item in the New Orleans Times- Picayune ,
July 9 . 1927 .

49Long , ~· cit ., p . 101 .
50
Ibid , , p . 102 .

51

Ibid .
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foot of high 1t1ater a year . 5 2

Governor Simpson was assaulted

for his alleged. padding of the ranks of the Conservation
Commission ,

11

a coon- chasin ' an 1 possum- watchin ' brigade ,

that does its job cruising around in a fancy boat in the
Gulf . u53
Long , the last to file in the race , 54 opened his
gubernatorial campaign in the hostile city of Alexandria .
Under the banner

11

EVEB.Y MAN A KING , BUT NO HAN WEARS A

CROHN 11 Huey and. his running mate , Dr . Paul Cyr ,55 presented
their platform: free textbooks; free bridges; permanent allweather roads ; natural gas for larger towns and. cities;
development of inland waterways; vocational training for
the deaf , dumb, and blind; and. enactment of an occupational
tax on Standard Oil Company . 56
The Kingfish 1 s campaign was probably unequaled in

52Quoted by !1artin,

.QJ2. •

cit ., p . 41 .

53Quoted by Harnett T. Kane , Louisiana Hayride: The
American Rehersal for Dictatorship , 1928 -19~· 0 (New York:-William Horrow andCOmpany, 19h1) , p . 56 .
51.{·
News item in the New Orleans Times - Picayune , July

6, 1927.

55 nr . Paul Cyr , a denist of Jeanerette , was a Creole

Catholic who had. been on the Bouanchaud ticket in 1924 .
5 6News item in~ Shreveport Times , August 4 , 1927;
and Long , .Q!?.• cit . , pp . 97- 98 .
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Louisiana ' s political history .

11

His meetings were a cross

between a New Orleans carnival parade , a revival meeting,
and. a Saturday sandlot baseball game .u 57

Huey stumpted. in

remote places that had never seen a gubernatorial contender
and. made speeches on a schedule that amazed. his opponents .
As his greatest strength lay in the rural sections , it was
to them that he directed. his campaign .
Huey 1 s melodramatic speech to a Cajun audience
projected. the campaign of 1928 into the realm of class
struggle within LoUisiana .

His attacks and. promises fused

in an emotional appeal to the lower- class whites and Negroes
to

11

kickout the old. gang" and corporations :
And it is here und.er this oak where Evangeline
waited. for her lover , Gabriel, who never came . This
oak is an immortal spot , mad.e so by Longfellow •s poem,
but Evangeline is not the only one who has waited here
in disappointment .
Where are the schools that you have waited. for your
child~en to have , that have never come?
Where are the
roads and highways that you sent your money to build,
and. are no nearer now than ever before? Where are
the institutions to care for the sick and disabled?
Evangeline wept bitter tears in her disappointment , but
it lasted. through only one lifetime . Your tears have
lasted for generations . Give me a chance to dry the
eyes of those who still weep here . 58

57Kane , 212.• cit ., p . 56 .

58Long ,

Q.E •

Cit ., P • 99 •
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Huey's victory in the January primary was of a
personal nature.

Long carried, with him into office only

Lieutenant-Governor Paul Cyr and. Treasurer H. B. Conner.
There were one hundred members in the House of Representatives and thirty-nine members of the Senate .

The Kingfish,

in his autobiography, reported that only eighteen members
I

of the House and nine members of the Senate had. supported.
his gubernatorial candidacy.59
The January primary placed. Long and \-Tilson in the
runoff, as shown in these results : 60
State

% State

Orleans

Other

Long

17 , 819

109 ,023

126,842

43 . 9

Wilson

38 , 24·Lf.

43 , 503

81 , 747

28 .3

Simpson

22 , 387

58 ,002

80,326

27 . 8

Total

78,387

210,528

288 , 915

Simpson and 1tl1lson , ho1-rever , both wi thd.rew from the
race , eliminating the need. for a runoff , and. Long was
nominated. as the Democratic candidate for governor.
A comparison of the vote- pattern in Figure 2 , page 16 ,

59

Long, QE• £!!• P • 107.
60 computed. from Compilation of Primary Election
Returns of the Democratic Party , State of Louisiana, held
January 17, 1928.
-
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45
and Figure 3, page 44 , will support the thesis of a class
struggle continuing in Louisiana .

In 1928 , Long held the

northern uplands and attracted only a six per cent increase
in the New Orleans vote over that of 1924 .

The increase in

strength came largely from the backing afforded. him by the
many small- farmer areas of south Louisiana .

The termination

of the Ku Klux Klan issue , coupled with Long ' s

11

politicking 11

from 1924 to 1927, had allowed class appeal to overcome the
sectionalism based on religious differences . 61
revolution

62

The class

of 1928 had its basis in Louisiana ' s past .

But the hopes of the "old gang , " the urban-planter alliance ,
Standard. Oil , and. others that the latest class movement
would also be abortive were short lived .

61 Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long ' s Louisiana: State
Politics , 1120-1952 (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University
Press , 1959 , P • 55 .
62
Carlton Beals , The Story 2[ Huey f • yang
(Philad.elphia : v. B. Lippencott Company , 1935 , pp . 21-27 .

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS: INAUGURATION TO IMPEACHMENT
Huey Long promised. big changes in both of his
campaigns.

"He promised big, partly because that was his

natm·e and partly because a big promised that took in the
interests of a large number of people was good strategy.u 1
However, it seemed. doubtful to supportez·s, opponents, and
disinterested. observers that he would be successful.

The

Kingfish met unreasoning and unscruplous resistence from
the "old. gang.u

The announcement of his principle demands

in 1928 led to an attempt in the next year to impeach him.
The impeachment unmistakably hardened Long, and the tactics
of the opposition and. his own tactics to overcome theirs
induced in him a measure of cynicism about the democratic
process.

According to Key, however, the Kingfish

is not to be dismissed. as a mere rabble-rouser or as a
leader of a gang of bood.lers. Nor can he be deseri bed
by convenient label: fascist, communist. He brought to
his career a streak of genius, yet 1n his program and.
tactics he lias ind.igenous to Louisiana as pine trees
and petroleum.2
The Governor-elect did. not wait for inauguration to
1

T. Barry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern
Polities (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), P• ?6.
2

v. o. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State
Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), P7 15?·

~
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launch his program.

As recorded in his autobiography, Long

asked. Governor Simpson

to begin opex·ation of free ferries
parallel to the toll brid.ges immed.iately. 113
11

The Louisiana Legislature met in the Capitol at
Baton Rouge on May 14, 1928, one week before Huey Long's
inauguration.

By an arrangement reached between his forces

and those elected on the Simpson ticket, the Kingfish was
able to have his captains, John B. Fournet and Philip H.
Gilbert, elected Speaker of the House and President Pro
Tempore, respectively. 4
On May 21, 1928, in the doubtless apocryphal

inaugural ad.dress, Long stated:
If in the course of the next four years I shall
have been able to protect, safeguard and advance the
interests of the same state, to harmonize and coordinate
our forces of labor and industry, agriculture and
commerce. • • • Then, I , in pride of my accomplishment, regard.less of whom I may please or offend, can
write "finis" to the political career • • • • :::>
The K1ngf1sh's unexpected 1n1t1al success before
the inauguration was a signal for bolder and more far3auey P. Long, Every Han ~ K1nf: ~ Autobiography
2!. Huey ~· Long {New Orleans: Nat1ona Book Company, 1933),
P• 109.
4

Louisiana House Journal, 1928 {Baton Rouge: 1928),
pp. 4-S; Louisiana Senate Journal, 1928 {Baton Rouge: 1928),
and Long, ~· ill·, p. 109-11.

sThe

full text of the address is in the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, May 22, 1928.
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reaching operations afterwards.

The Governor proposed,

what he termed, "legislation to strengthen the hand of the
administration." 6 In his attempt to break the New Orleans
bloc, Long organized. the Legislature by "personally
dictating"? all committee appointments. 8
Two weeks after the election, Long delivered a
broadside against the New Orleans Ring.

The Democratic

State Committee assembled in the crescent City in February
to call a convention to select representatives for the
Democratic National Convention.

The choice was usually

based upon the strength of the factions 1n the Legislature.
where Long was weak and where the Ring held a sizable bloc.
Long and a political ally, Harvey G. Fields, the Committee
Chairman, found that the Constitution of 1921 did not
specifically call for a convention.
Committee itself name the d.elegation.

They had the State
A Longite slate

was selected., omitting representatives of the New Orleans
machine and the urban-planter allainoe.9

6
Long, ~· ill•, P• 109.
7
Hermann B. Deustoh, "Kingdom of the K1ngfish, ••
New Orleans Item, August 10, 1939, p. 12a.
8

LoUisiana House Journal, 1928, PP• 13-15.
9
Deustoh, 2R• ~ •• p. 13a.

The Governor's two major goals were to secure the
state's patronage by securing control of the various
boards and to sucessfully launch his program of legislation
to fulfill his campaign promises.

Long's impatient efforts

led him to violate the usual precedents and proprities of
the office.

He invaded the floor of the House and the

Senate to line up backing for his bills and hastened procedures by giving instructions to his supporters. 10 With
the help of the Simpson-ticket forces he managed to muster
a majority in the Legislature. although they did not align
with him on all occasions.

At times. threats of desertion

caused him to avoid combat on an issue he favored and at
other times actual desertion caused bills to die.
Despite his maneuvering, constant bickering and a
mass of bills introduced by the opposition forces clogged
the legislative calendar and made it impossible to force
consideration on Long's important proposals.

The Kingfish

finally evaded the delimmas he had the administration floor
leaders move for first passage on every bill as fast as its
number appeared.

The calendar was cleared in a few hours,

while the opposition watched helplessly.
10
News item in the

~

"I later," Long

York_Times, July 19, 1928.
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wrote,

11

vetoed. the objectionable bills by the score.n 11

To fulfill his campaign pledges it was necessary for
Long to develop sources of strong financial backing.

To

raise money for the institutions for the deaf, dumb, and
blind, the charity hospital, and the public schools, the
Governor proposed a carbon black12 tax of four cents per
pound.13

The free textbooks were to be provided by an

increase 1n the severance tax on such natural resources as
lumber, salt, gas. and. oil. 14 Another bill provided for
a constitutional amendment. to be submitted. to the voters.
for doubling the two-cent tax on gasoline.

The new tax-

rate would make possible the retirement of a bond issue
of $30,000,000 which was earmarked for hardsurfacing of
highways and the construction of free bridges. 15
The legislation met with a vast amount of entrenched
opposition.

The carbon black and oil interests voiced

11
Louisiana House Journal,
12
Carbon black was made by
natural gas against tin.
13
Louisiana House Journal,
14
Louisiana House Journal,
15

~·

1928, pp. 529-82.
wastefully burning
1928, pp. 446-47.
1928, pp. 352-53. 412.
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strong opposition to the proposal affecting them. 16 As
Long recorded in his autobiography:
The demonstration staged by the friends of the
Standard Oil Company and its allies against the
additional tax on oil resulted in a frenzied session
• • • [withl the combined opposition of the public
press, of the chambers of commerce and boards of tr!~e,
aid.ed about the cause by the corporation lobbyists.
In spite of the fierce opposition, Long scored a
limited success on the plan for a four-cent tax on carbon
black.

The clash was so strong that the tax was reduced

to one-half a cent per pound, even though many doubted that
the revenues would be sufficient. 18
Another of Governor Long's major accomplishments
in the 1928 regular legislative session was the enactment
of the free textbook law.

The necessary funds were

supplied by an increase in the severance tax on natural
resources based on the quantity-of-product severed, rather
than upon value, as under existing law.

Although the

Constitution of 1921 expressly prohibited. state aid to
"private or sectarian schools," Long's plan was designed.
to make all elementary and high school students--in private,
public, and parochial schools--the beneficiaries of free
1

~ane,

17Long,

ill·, P• 65
~· ill•, P• 111.

2£•

18Louisiana House Journal, 1928, PP• 446-47.
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textbooks.

With characteristic originality, the Kingrish

ducked the 1921 constitutional prohibition by adopting the
argument that the state was supplying the textbooks to the
students, not the schools, and was merely using the schools
as convenient distribution centers. 19 The law was at once
taken to the courts, but in a ruling of national importance,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the textbook law. 20
While it may be properly observed that the free textbook law was politically wise and used to cement the loyalty
or many south Louisiana Catholics to Longism, 21 it must
also be observed that the law was a basic element in the
Long philosophy.

In his "concentration of wealth" letter

Long stated that the "greatest cause ror ind.ustrial unrest
was that of education. 1122 When the K1ngfish took office
LoUisiana ranked first among the states in the percentage of
illiterates within the populat1on. 23 As late as 1940, after

281

u.

1 9LoU1siana House Journal, 1928, pp. 412-13.
20
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board 2!. Education,
s. 370 (1930).
21
Sindler, ~· ~·· p. 59·
22c.f. ante, p. 28.

23
Computed from the United States Bureau of the
Census, Fifteenth Census 2!. ~ Un1 ted States: !.2.lQ..
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935).
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Among Long's more successful measures was a bill
which provided for a constitutional amendment, to be
submitted to the voters, for the increase in the gasoline
tax.

It was attacked because it was said that there was

no guarantee that the funds, which were to be expended in
highway and bridge construction, would not merely be used
to increase the payroll of the Highway Commission for
political purposes.

Others declared that the proposal was

extravagant and that the state was unable to assume such a
financial burden.

The bill was passed after a lengthy

discussion, partly because many Solons believed that the
voters would not approve the tax increase.JO Another
administration bill which authorized a $15,000,000 bond
issue for the building of seawalls on the shore of Lake
Pontchartrain at New Orleans, also won a majority.Jl
Long's objective of gaining control of the major
patronage of the state also met with success.

His first

official act as governor had been to appoint new members to
the contract-letting Highway Commission, which was already
under control of the executive department.

The new chair-

JOLoUlsiana House Journal, 1928, PP• 188-89, 412lJ; and the~~ Times, July 19, 1928.

31Acts, State 2f. Louis!.!!!!, 1928, pp • .34-42.
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man was Long 1 s W1nn Parish neighbor, Oscar Kelly "OK"
Allen.J 2 As promised during the campaign, an investigation
of the Commission was beg'lm and. the former head. of the
organization, Major Frank T. Payne, was charged with the
violation of state cod.es regulating the expend! ture of state
fund.s by District Attorney John Od.en.33
The K1ngf1sh demanded the resignation of other
officials answerable to him and set in motion a plan to
oust others who opposed. him.

While the press and opposition

cried "spoilsman," it became increasingly clear that Long
was determined. to have the support of men in major pos1 tions
who would not hamper his program.
One measure replaced nine members of the Orleans
Parish Levee Board with a five member group appointed by
the governor.

The Fuqua and Simpson forces were replaced

by Long1tes and opponents of the Ring.

The bill also

eliminated the New Orleans mayor as an ex-officio member
of the Board.J4
Another attack was leveled against the State Board

32
28, 1928.
JJ
J, 1928.

News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May
News item in the New Orleans Times-P1ca;y:une, June

J 4Acts, State of Louisiana, 1928, pp. 10?-08.
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a broad. educational program was begun, 39.6 per cent of all
white males und.er twenty-five had never received more than
four years of schooling. 24 In no small way, this condition
was fostered by the role of the Catholic Church in the
state's ed.ucational arrangement. 25

Thus, the free textbook

law was not merely a device to attract a Catholic bloc-vote,
but a means of modernizing the entire educational structure
within the state.
Opposition to the free textbook law centered in
the anti-Long city of Shreveport in Caddo Parish, the only
parish to oppose the issuance of #30,000,000 of bonds for
highway construction purposes.

The forces were led by a

long-time political enemy, Mayor L. E. Thomas.

"This is

a rich section of the state," said Thomas, "we are not going
to be humiliated lor degraded by having it advertised that
our children had to be given books free. 112 6 At the same
time, the Baptist State Convention, meeting in Shreveport,
saw in the law a religious issue and passed. a resolution
condemning it.
24
Computed. from the United States Bureau of the
Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945).

25
Key, 2R• £11•• PP• 157-58.
26
Long, 22• ~·• PP• 114-15.
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Long bided his time until conditions were in his
favor.

A delegation from Shreveport called. on the Governor

to ask his support for a project that would be important to
Shreveport's economy.

The federal government wanted to

build an airport for its Third. Attack Wing adjacent to the
city.

All that was needed was an eighty-acre plot, which

was under state control.

It would. be a paper transaction

for the state to deed the land to the city so the requirements for the fed.eral agreement could. be met.

Long, however

since Shreveport continued to reject the free textbooks,
maintained that "people so well off don't need an airport."27
An

act had been introduced and. passed by the

Legislature in May authorizing cities to acquire such land
"within or without" the parish and donate it to the federal
government.

However, in the official record.ing of the law,
the words 11 or without" had. been omitted. 28 The problem was

solved when Caddo Parish agreed. to accept the free textbooks
if the Governor would call a supplemental session to correct
the error. 29
27
Long, 2£• cit., p. 115.
28
Louisiana House Journal, 1928, pp. 242-44; and
Acts, State 2£ Louisiana, 1928 (Baton Rouge: 1928), pp. 2627.
29
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
December 10-12, 1928.
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of Hea1th.

Long dismissed the Presid.ent, Dr. Oscar Dowling,

who was accused of wasting fifty thousand. dollars per year.
The doctor, however, refused to vacate his office.

The

administration, therefore, passed a bill ending Dowling's
term of office on August 24, 1928, instead of 1932.35
Dowling appealed. to Attroney-General Percy Saint, who
d.eclared that the removal was not legal.J 6 However, Dr.
Dowling was "forced." out of the office and replaced by a
Longite, Dr. Joseph A. O'Hara.

The Louisiana State Supreme

Court upheld the new appointment in January of the following
year.J7
The assault on the Conservation Commission resulted
in a powerful lever in the manipulation of state patronage.

Dr.

v.

K. Irion refused to vacate his office on the Dowling

plea of unconstitutionality.

Opponents claimed that Long

was und.o ing the work of many years of depoli ticalizing the
body.

To eliminate the type of hinderance caused. by Irion

and Dowling, an administration bill was passed. giving the
Governor the power to file "intrusion-in-office" suits
35Lou1siana House Journal, 1928, pp. 66J-64.

36

OSinions of the Attorney-General of Louisiana,

~. to April ~. 1930 (New OrleanS: 1930), pp.

37
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
January 8, 1929.
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without the aid or consent of the Attorney-General if any
persons 11 obstructed the operation11 of a state board.• 3 8
Although the Governor achieved an unexpected degree
of success, he was slowed. by many setbacks.

One administra-

tion measure which failed. would have given the Governor the
authority to reorganize the New Orleans Charity Hospital
complex and to achieve control of the Crescent City's Court
House Commission.39 Although a long delay in the higher
courts was obvious, Long's bill to appoint additional Court
of Appeal justices did not win a majority. 40 Long likewise
failed to have approved. bills which provided for the
replacement of seven Orleans Parish tax assessors with one
man, replacement of the Orleans Parish Ring-backed sheriff,
and a $35,000 appropriation to boost the size of the state
m1litia. 41
The Legislature, in regular session, added 297 laws
to the statute books, but certain others were vetoed. by the
Governor.

The opposition focused much attention upon the

cattle-tick eradication bill which was vetoed. by Governor
38
Acts, State of Louisiana, 1928, pp. 117-18; and
news item-r:n-~e New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 2, 1928.
39LoU1siana House Journal, 1928, p. 222.
l~O
l~l

Louisiana House Journal, 1928, p. 429-37.
News item in the New

~

Times, July 29, 1928.
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Long.

Many said the measure was unworkable and Long claimed

that he feared bodily harm would result from forced cattle
dipping.

He did not believe the law would. be workable in a

state which was still "open range" by law.

In a lengthy

and d.etailed veto message, Long explained. why he favored the
move.

"Some little reflection on the score of human psychol-

ogy had better be made before we make a move that reqUires
the state militia." 42 However, the opposition claimed that
the only reason that Long opposed. the bill was that the
opposition had instituted it and was afraid that enactment
might eliminate his following of small farmers with whom
the bill was popular.43

An appropriation of $20,400, earmarked for the
Conservation Commission, was also vetoed.

Critics claimed

that Long was motivated by a d.esire for personal revenge
against Chairman Francis Williams, who had broken with
Long during the 1928 gubernatorial campaign and had become
a Ring leader. 44 Long stated that the Commission had fund.s
available and had "performed practically no service of
benefit and use and is not now performing any practical
42News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July
14, 1928.
!~J

News item in the ~ York Times, July 29, 1928.
44
Kane, 22• cit., p. 65.
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service to the public."

It should, therefore, he replied,

be made to exist "on the sum which was approximately the
amount the same Commission operated. on when it ad.mittedly
was of benefit to the public."

Williams' bitter response

was that Long had "no more scrupples than the assassin who
cowardly conceals himself in the d.ark and strikes his
adversery from beh1nd." 45
Two other bills introduced by anti-Long forces
were killed by the Governor's veto.

One measure provided

that delegates to the national conventions must be picked
only by state convention.

Another limited the salary of the

Highway Commission attorney and required his residence to
be in Baton Rouge. 46
Following his vetoes, Long suffered many assaults
from various publications, the Nation attacked:
Every proposal for legislation, every acceptance of
a bill, every appointment to office, every public act
of Mr. Long, has been d.estined to create for him a
slave-like political machine~ thwart the will of the
people, mock the legislature and. circumvent the laws
• • • • The result has been to spread the weight of
spoils politics everywhere. 4 7

45

News item 1n the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July
1928.
46
Hermann B. Deustch, "Kingdom of the Kingfish," New
Orleans Item, August 10, 1939.
47
George Goad, "I'm the Constitution of LoUisiana,"
Nation, CXXVIII (1929), 418-19.
1L~.
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In contrast, one of Long's most critical biographers
stated:
Not Huey, but the political system was to be blamed.
Theoretically, the various boards had been previously
taken out of politics. But as a single party and a
single machine had dominated. Louisiana for decades, all
governmental agencies were an integral part of the
corrupt system. Non-politicalizing the boards in effect
had merely permitted Ring henchmen to enjoy perfect job
immunity, creating foci of permanent political power.
Though not subject to the spoils system of each
governor, the board.s were all part of a complicated.
regeme of a vicious political elite tied up with the
large corporations and underworld. Huey h!S ~ 2:£
exactly ~ ~ ~. or else be another meek corporation
and underworld. puppet like his predecessors. Whether
his purposes were genius, whether the reforms he
espoused were worthi and important, are separate
questions entirely. 8
In an attempt to fulfill a campaign promise, natural
gas for New Orleans, the Kingfish set off another controversy.

Natural gas had been piped from north Louisiana

to within a few miles of the crescent City.

But in 1921,

New Orleans had granted New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,
(NOPSI) a franchise which stipulated that the city could
purchase the properties of that utility company at a
specified rate and operate them under municipal ownership.
By 1928, NOFSI still monopolized the power to city consumers, including artificial gas at the high rate of $1.)5
48 carlton Beals, The Story 2! Huey f· Long
(Philadelphia: v. B. Lippencott Company, 1935), p. 92.

62
per thousand. cubic feet (MCF).

Although many interests

sought the opportunity to sell New Orleans natural gas from
the field.s in the Monroe area at a cheaper rate, NOPSI had.
convinced the Commission Council that such offers were not
practical.

Governor Long's verbal assault, unlike those of
earlier governors, was followed by d.irect action. 4 9 The

Kingfish had Senator Fernand.ez of Orleans Parish introduce
a battery of measures authorizing the Commission Council of
New Orleans to issue $50,000,000 in bonds for the purchase
of NOPSI 's properties and instituting enabling acts for the
operation of the utility service.5°

With the bills as

leverage, Long, in an ill-worded attempt to squelsh
opposition by the Ring, said:
A deck has 52 cards and in Baton Rouge I hold. all
I
can have bills passed or I can kill thim. I'll give
you [NOPSI] until Saturday to decide.5

52 of them and can shuffle and deal as I please.

On Saturday, June 25, NO PSI agreed. to allow natural
gas into the city at a consumer rate of $0 .90 per thousand
cubic feet (MCF) plus a $0 .25 monthly meter charge.5 2
4 9Beals, ~· cit., p. 73; and Long, op. cit., PP•
111-112.
5°Louisiana Senate Journal, 1928, pp. 219, 445-LI·7·
51 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, June
26, 1928.
5 2Hermann B. Deutsch, ~· cit., p. lJa.
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The legislative session end.ed in July with a general
triumph for the Kingfish.

Long had been able to obtain most

of the important laws he had sought.

He had been handed

several setbacks but, for the most part, they were minor.
The major exception was the request for the occupational
license tax on the petroleum industry, which would have
been used to finance improvements in the state's school
system, hospital complex, and mental ward.s.
Following legislative adjournment, the Kingfish was
faced with the problem of securing backing for his
constitutional amend.ments which increased the gasoline tax
and endorsed the road construction bond issue.

The bills

had been passed. by the Legislature, but they had to stand
the test of radification at the polls on November 16, the
same day Hoover faced Al Smith in the national election.
DUe to the religious issue, Hoover had a considerable
following in Louisiana, and party captains felt the need. of
conducting an active campaign in the normally Democratic
state.

Long, therefore, campaigned during the summer months

with a dual purpose.53
53
Thomas Harris, The Kinfiish, Huey P. Long,
Dictator (New York: Pelican Pub~shlng company, 1938), pp.

44=46.
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The principle criticisms against the amendment to
raise the gasoline tax was that there was no safety check to
guarantee proper handling and expenditure of the funds.

The

New Orleans machine claimed that Long was being handed a
"political war chest."

To silence his opponents, the King-

fish announced on August 22, 1928, that if the amendments
were ratified, he would name a "road bond. advisory committee
of eleven outstanding citizens to supervise the handling of
funds."

The names he mentioned were described as "unim-

peachable" by both factions.5 4
On August 29, 1928, the two largest commercial and
civic organizations in New Orleans, the Young Men's Business
Club and the Association of Commerce, voted approval of the
bond issue in spite of Ring opposition. 55
The Ring demand.ed a special legislative session to
be called to legalize the Road Committee by penning it into
the act.

The Kingfish agreed. to this, if the Ring would,

in turn, back the amendments during the special session and
later at the polls in November.

The Ring attempted to duck

the issue by answering in an ambiguously worded message and.
on September 19, 1928, issued an unmistakable statement of
54

Hermann B. Deutsch, "Kingdom of the Kingfish," New
Orleans Item, August 14, 1939.

55
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 30, 1928.
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6

opposition. 5

Governor Long sent the text of the proposed addition
to the amendment to all members of the Legislature with the
request that they inform him whether or not they would vote
for it.

The Ring voted ttNo.u

Their bloc-vote made it

impossible to secure the necessary two-thirds vote for a
constitutional amendment.

Therefore, the Governor announced

that no special legislative session would be called57
On November 16, the voters of the state approved both
constitutional

amend~ents

with an overwhelming majority.

In the Crescent City, only two of the seventeen wards
rejected. the amendments; one ward by only five votes and
the other by only three votes.58
Jefferson and. St. Bernard parishes, to the south of
New Orleans, were the Mecca of gambling and vice, operating
under the indulgent eyes of corrupt local officials.59
Traditionally, these parishes had gone their way, un6
5 neustch, loc. cit.
57News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 23-0ctober 23, 1928: and Long, ~· £11•• pp. 117-18.
58News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
November 17 and 18, 1928.
59Martin, ~· £!!., p. 52.

66
challenged. by state officials.

The new Governor was urged

by the New OI•leans Association of Commerce and several state
newspapers to muster an attack on the illegal gaming.

Long

issued a characteristically strong statement to the TimesPicayune:
I warn them now that if gambling continues in New
Orleans • • • the state militia will patrol the streets
of the city. We are not going to stand for open lawlessness in the New orleans area d.uring the four years
that I am governor. 60

The ed.ict went unheeded and gambling continued in
st. Bernard. Parish, with the newspaper boasting of the
61
fact.
A few days later a detachment of state militia
was mobilized to raid gaming houses in st. Bernard Parish
to serve, in Long's words, "as a warning to all gamblers
in the New Orleans area.n 62 The troopers broke up tables,
ripped out roulette wheels and "slots," and. confiscated a
reported $25,00o. 63
The St. Bernard Parish Sheriff, L. H. Neraux, hastily
60

News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica,une,
August 1, 1928: and the New York Times, August 1 , 1928.
61
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 10, 1928.
62
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 12, 1928.
6
3News item in the New Orleans Times-Picazune,
August 11, 1928.
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gave approval:
He [Governor Long] and the people of the state may rest
assured that even if I have to aband.on my weekend
vacation, there will be no repetition of lawbreaking in
the parish. [st. Bernard] while I occupy the office of
sheriff. 6LI·
Many of the state's newspapers denounced Governor

Long for the raids, and state Attroney-General Percy Saint,
in an official ruling, declared that the raids were illegal
because the Governor had not declared martial law before
calling out the militia.65

The Kingfish replied that "no
one had asked him [Saint] for h1s opinion.u 66 The Governor
continued:
We have paid no attention to, and will pay no
attention to any opinion of the Attorney-General
protecting the gambling interests, or which would
make ig impossible for us to enforce the law of the
state. 7
There were three possible motives for the Governor's
raids on the gambling establishments: a political move to
please his predominately Baptist, hill-parish voters;
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News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 12, 1928.
65
opinions 2! the Attorney-General 2! Louisiana,
lla.Y !. 1928, ~April 1Q.,_ 12.2Q, pp. 51-53; and the New
Orleans Times-Picayune, November 18, 1928.
66
Quoted in Martin, ~· cit., p. 53.
67News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
November 19 and 20, 1928.
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an attack on a region that was largely anti-Long; or an
attempt to cut off gambling funds to the New Orleans Ring,
in the fight against Long.
came from the raids.

Whatever the case, little gain

They stirred. up the opposition in the

lower parishes and contributed to the growing belief that
Long was a dangerous "Tin-pot Napoleon."68
Following the November approval of the constitutional
amendments, Long called a special six-day session to meet
on December 10, 1928.

The Legislature was to pass enabling

acts to permit highway construction to begin immediately.
Attorney-General Saint requested that the Governor include
in the call an anti-gambling and racing law, since the present laws were "inad.equate."

The Governor replied by stating

that he could. not understand why Saint wanted additional
laws, ttwhen he won't enforce the laws we now have and. keeps
interfering with me when I try to enforce them.n 69
On the first d.ay of the special session the Governor
spoke to the Legislature:
I urge you to speed up your work, suspend your
rules to advance bills, conclude your business and
adjourn within the six d.ay time lim1 t placed on

68

Martin , 2R• cit., p. 53 .

69News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
December 2, 1928.
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the session.7°
With the will of the voters clearly shown in the November
polling, the Legislature had little choice in the matter.
The rules were suspended. and. the bill was..- passed. in record
time.71
LoUisiana's most sensational murder case alienated
Governor Long and two powerful state figures, LieutenantGovernor Paul Cyr and publisher John Ewing.

Dr. Thomas E.

LeBoeuf and Mrs. Ad.a Dreher had been convicted. of ·the
murder of Mrs . Dreher's husband James.
sentenced to be hanged.

The two were

Thus, Mrs . Dreher would be the first

white woman in the history of the state to go to the gallows.
Colonel Ewing 's Daily States and the Shreveport Times
suggested. clemency, a commuted sentence.

Under pressure,

Long did grant a reprieve from December 21, 1928, until
January 5. 1929.

In a rare stand with the Governor, the

hostile Times-Picayune endorsed. the Governor's refusal to
commute the sentence: "We think the Governor's reasoning and

7°News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
December 11, 1928.

71

Louisiana House Journal, Third Extra Session,
1928, (Baton Rouge: 1928); Louisiana Senate Journal, Third
Extra Session, 1928 (Baton Rouge : 1928}; and the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, December 14-19, 1928.
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decision are alike sound. We honor him for the courage he
d.isplayed. 11 72 Lieutenant-Governor Cyr, however, a personal
friend of Mrs. Dreher, roared., "How long have I been
humiliated. by having to deal with this man," when Long
refused to commute the sentence.73

He further claimed that

the Governor had. "double-crossed." him.74

He stated that the

Governor had agreed to leave the state so that he, as acting
governor, could issue reqUisite commutation of sentence
warrants. 75
The convicted murders were executed on February 1,
1929, after the first clegree murder charge was upheld. by

the State Supreme Court.

In public statements, Lieutenant-

Governor Cyr and Attorney-General Saint, who had also
entered the fight against Long, made it appear that the
Governor was personally responsible for the executions.
72 Editorial in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
January J. 1929.
73Quoted in Martin, ~· cit., p. 54.
74 New Orleans Item d.ispatch of January 11, 1929:
"Franklin, La., Jan. 10-- 1 I 'd. not only settle the LeBoeufDreher case, but I would pardon the kidnappers,• LieutenantGovernor Paul Cyr remarked. here this afternoon, upon his
return from a futile visit to Baton Rouge, in response to a
suggestion that Governor Huey P. Long might have been
kidnapped."
75News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
January 4, 1929.
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Unaware of imminent impeachment, the Kingf1sh could
look back on his first eight months in office with justifiable pride.

Although his efforts to extend and consolidate

gubernatorial control of patronage met with considerable
opposition, the fulfillment of many of his campaign promises
had add.ed up to a progressive and free-spending program.
That program was opposed and resented by conservatives but
fell far short of radicalism.7 6

6

7 sindler,

~·

cit., p. 61.

CHAPTER V
CONSERVATIVE COUNTERATTACK

While the anti-Longs termed. their position in the
tradition of "good government," they were, in fact, more
concerned with the outcome of the game or politics than how
the game was played.

Conservative opposition to Long was

translated into impeachment primarily because the Kingfish
sought to root his power in the loyalty or the masses of
voters.

Inevitably, as the lower classes were made aware

of their political strength, there would occur a political
restructuring disadvantageous to the interests of the upper
classes.

"The anti-Longs resorted. to impeachment in order

to prevent a distasteful present from becoming an unbearable
future." 1
Having finished a special session a scant two months
before, the state's Solons were jolted. by a call for
another session.

This time, Long d.irected the Legislature

to convene on March 18, 1929, for a six-d.ay special session
to overcome certain objections raised by the United States
Supreme Court to laws he had fostered.

The Governor stated

that he would also 1nclud.e in the call a provision for
1

Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana: State
Politics, 1120-19g2 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1959 , P• 1.
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collecting the state's full share of the inheritance tax as
allowed by federal law, a change in the paving laws to
facilitate the highway program in Orleans Parish, and "one
or two other matters.n 2
On March 15, 1929, the "other matters" were revealed.
The Governor called for legislation levying an occupational
tax of five cents a barrel on the refining of oil.J

The

funds, he explained, were desperately need.ed. for the
ed.ucational program, the tuberculous sanitariums, the mental
wards, and the institutions for the deaf, dumb, and blind.
The Governor continued:
Practically all the business and professions pay
a privilege license • • • but such privilege license,
up to this time, has not been assessed upon the oil
industry of the state • • • • I am hoping that the
oil trusts will not make any opposition to this form
of 11ceij8e, as they have done to progressive movements
before.
There was little doubt that the state's indigents

~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March
4, 1929.
J
Ten months earlier, in regular session, Long had
introd.uced his occupational license tax of five cents a
barrel of oil, but had withdrawn it in the face of fierce
opposition.

4News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March
16, 1929; and see the full text of the bill in LoUisiana

House Journal, Fourth Extra Session, ill.2, (Baton Rouge:
1929) t pp. 9-10.
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and public institutions would benefit from the proposals.
But there was also the belief that, at least in part, the
Kingfish's motives lay in penalizing the Standard Oil Company, the "Octopus" against which he had never ceased to rail.
That Standard. itself felt it was being singled out as a
target was never a question.

Standard Oil President D. R.

Wells, upon hearing of the special session, immediately
came to Baton Rouge, established headquarters in the Hotel
Heidelberg and remained for the entire session.
The Kingfish's success in the regular session and in
the December special session had perhaps swelled his ego.
His call for a special session of only six days, was in
itself evid.ence that he expected little difficulty in getting
his measures approved.•
As the official proceedings of the state Legislature
indicate, the atmosphere had turned. "to a white heat. 11 5
Chambers for commerce, boards of trade, lawyers, special
correspondents, corporation lobbyists, Standard Oil agents,
and the ex-office holders of the Ring converged on Baton
Rouge.

The Standard. Oil Company, with 8, 000 employees in

Baton Rouge alone, announced that it would not meet the tax
Sauey P. Long, Every Man .! King: ~Autobiography
~ (New Orleans: National Book Company, 1933),

2f. Huey 1:•
P• 123.
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and would close its refineries if pressured. 6

The anti-

Longs saw their chance and enlisted firm support from civic
and commercial organizations throughout the state.?
The tone of the special session was set when Rabbi
Walter Piser refused. an invitation to deliver the opening
prayer because he "could not call down the blessing of
God on such a governor."8

To accomplish the Governor's

bidd.ing in six days, it would be necessary for the Solons
to suspend the legislative rules.

However, the necessary

two-thirds vote was not secured.9

Thus, two days later,

his occupational license tax no nearer introduction than
it was on the first, Long asked. the Legislature to ad.journ
the session, then promptly called a new one--this time for
a more realistic eighteen d.ays, beginning on March 20, 1929.

6Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Ha~ide: The American
Rehersal !2£ Dictatorship, 1928-1940 :New York: William
Morrow and Company, 1941), p. 69.
7Communications read into the Louisiana House
Journal, Fourth Extra. Session, .!.2£2. (Baton Rouge: 1929), pp.
9, 19-20; and Louisiana Senate Journal, Fourth Extra
Session, ~ (Baton Rouge: 1929), PP• 5-6, 9, 14-15.
8

Stan Optowsky, The Long6 of Louisiana (New York: E.
P. Dutton and Company, fii'C., 19
p. 46.
9Louisiana House Journal, Fourth Extra Session, .!.2£2,
pp. 10-11; and Louisiana Senate Journal, Fourth Extra Session,
!.2,g,2, PP• 11-12.

o>:
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The business elements of the state, under the leadership of Standard Oil, undoubtedly comprised the major forces
in the anti-Long battle.

To that core were recruited such

political enemies of the Kingfish as his former ally, Ewing,
Cyr, Sullivan, the Ring, and the "New" Ring, as well as a
flood. of opportunistic politicians once pro-Long but now
d.eserting what they believed to be a sinking ship.
On March 20, 1929, the first day of the new session,
the House protested Long's personal lobbying on the floor
and. Jared Y. Sanders, Jr., the son of the former Gove.tmor,
introduced a resolution condemning Long for "trading
votes.u 10 On the floor the same day, Lieutenant-Governor
Cyr made his sensational accusation:

Long had. approved the

leasing of $1,800,000 worth of Louisiana oil lands to a
Texas oil company at terms grossly unfair to the state and
had attempted. to bribe Cyr into supporting the occupational
license tax. 11 Cyr continued by describing Governor Huey
P. Long as the
worst political tyrant who ever attempted to rule
the state • • • making a fight against the largest
10Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session,
1929 (Baton Rouge: 1929), p. 6; the~~ Times, March
22, 1929: and the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 21,
1929.
11Long 1 s approval constituted no more than a routine
permission to drill, and the leases in question were
transferred in the Parker administration.

77
industry of Louisiana. If the good Lord will ever
forgive me for supporting Huey l~ Long, it will take
a great load off my conscience.
The Lieutenant-Governor also warned that "from today on
I promise to keep as close an eye on the governor as one
man can keep on another. ~ •.13
The futility of the session was d.emonstrated when
the Senate created a committee to investigate the needs of
the state institutions and the House announced that lengthy
hearings would. be held.

This meant that there would. not
be enough time left for the enactment of legislation. 14
On March 21, 1929, Governor Long's crude intimidation

of the press in the Manship affair was revealed by Charles
Manship, publisher of the anti-Long Baton Rouge State Times,
in a carefully worded front-page editorial entitled,
"This Gentlemen, Is The Way Your Governor Fights.tt 1 5
According to Manship, the Governor had warned him that if
1

~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
March 21, 1929.
1 3Quoted in Martin, Dynasty: ~ Longs g! Louisiana,
P• 57•

14Lou1siana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session,
PP• 15-16; LoUisiana Senate Journal, Fifth Extra
Session, ~. pp. 10-ll; and the Times-Picayune, March
2l, 1929.

~.

1 5Ed1tor1al 1n the Baton Rouge State Times, March
21, 1929.
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he persisted in his opposition to the occupational license
tax, there would be published "a list of names of the people
who are fighting me who have relatives in the insane asylum.u
Manship continued. by noting that he had a brother, Douglas,
who was in the East Louisiana Hospital undergoing psychiatric
treatment. 16
The legislators were outraged by this low blow.

On

March 22, Colonel Ewing's Shreveport Journal called for an
investigation of the Governor, with a view toward impeachment, in an ed.itorial entitled, "Time to End Tyranny.nl7
Two days later a worried Governor was urging Solons to
draft their own tax measures to satisfy the financial
needs of the state charitable institutions and the schools.
But the tide of anti-Long charges continued to rise,
culminating in a most grave--or most absurd--accusation
which led. to events helpful to the forces in favor of
impeachment.

16rbid.
17Ed.i torial in the Shreveport Journal, March 22,
1929; and Sind.ler, ~Long's Louisiana: State Politics,
1920-~, P• 62.
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At the night session of the Legislature, March 25,
1929, there was "an atmosphere of excitment.n 18 The date
has become known as "Blood.y Mond.ay" in Louisiana history. 1 9
Bepresentati ve Cecil Morgan of Shreveport, Cadd.o Parish,
demanded recognition from Speaker Fournet, a Long captain,
on a point of personal privilege.

It was an open secret

that Representative Morgan intend.ed to read an affidavit
accusing Governor Long of seeking to arrange the murder
of an anti-Long state official, Representative Jared Y.
Sanders, Jr., the son of the former Governor.
Speaker Fournet instead recognized a Long stalwart
who, having knowled.ge of the Morgan plot, moved for
immediate ad.journment

~

lli· Morgan leaped from his

desk, his hand waving a document.

"I am speaking, and I

will not yield. the floor," he yelled.

"I have in my hand

an affidavit from a Baton Rouge citizen that the Governor
has tried to procure the assassination of a member of the
House.n 20
18News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
March 24, 1929.
1 9The official record gives no indication of the
irregularity.
20Quoted in Opotowsky, QE• cit., P• 42.
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The affadavi t, Morgan charged, had been signed by
the Kingfish' s former bodyguard., "Battling" Bozeman , who
had detailed how Long had promised him "many gold dollars"
to leave J[ared]. Y. Sanders, Jr., in a ditch. 21 Even as
Morgan spoke, Speaker Fournet banged his gavel.

A motion

to adjourn the session, made by a Long legislator, had
been recognized.

The House would vote.

There was bedlam now.

Legislators formed. a cordon

around Representative Morgan and escorted him to the front
of the chamber.

A torrent of shouts rained through the

House , and Speaker Fournet called, "A motion to ad.journ
~

l l i is recognized. A vote."
The Representative scurried to their seats to press

their buttons on the electric voting machine.

On the vote

on the adjournment motion, the electric tally board behind
the Speaker recorded the individual votes every which way.
"Fi:r:l Fixt

The machine is fixed!" was the cry.

Mason

Spencer, a Representative, leaped to the rostrum, seized.
the gavel from Speaker Fournet's hand, and began pounding
wildly .

Another climbed up the ladder to the voting machine

and then leaped down atop a pocket of angry legislators.

21 For the completed text, Louisiana House Journal,
Fifth Extra Session, 12£2, pp. 29-J2.
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Order was restored only after it was discovered that
the voting machine had not been cleared after the last roll
call vote. 22 The roll was called by voice: 71 votes
against adjournment, 9 votes in favor.
until morning. 23

The House recessed

Bloody Monday ended with the wildest free-for-all
in a Louisiana legislative hall since the days of
Reconstruction.

It also marked the beginning of a

political battle that was to shape Louisiana politics for
many years. 24
The next day the administration backers, now a
minority, made attempts to introduce resolutions of
adjournment.

Speaker Fournet read a formal statement to

the House deploring the previous days' malee, acknowledging
"his own fault" in the confusion, and explaining the
22All but the most extreme anti-Longs accept this
version of the story. Even the hostile Times-Pica~e,
March 26, 1929, did, for as Long pointed out, the cerk of
the voting machine was a nephew of Senator Ransdell, who
was at that time an anti-Long leader.
2Jtou.isiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session,
1929, P• 41.
24This study of Bloody Monday is based on Martin,
~· cit., PP• 58-60; Sindler, ~· cit., PP• 62-63;
Opotowsky, ~· £!!•• pp. 46-47; Times-Picazune, March 26,
1929; and an interview with James LOwery, secretary to the
late A. o. Campbell of Mid-Continent Oil and Gas and a
licensed lobbyist, who was present at the time.
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ttmechanical difficult1es . u25

The House, including some

members who might normally have sid.ed. w1 th Long but who
bell eve d. he had. tampered with the machine, was clearly
impeachment minded..
The state's press reacted in predictable fashion.
In its edition of March 27, the conservative Times-Picayune
placed. its stamp of approval on the movement to remove
the Kingf1sh from office: "The reason for this is that
he is tempermentally and otherwise unfit to hold office.
His tactics and methods reveal him to be a cruel political
tyrant.u 26
Of the two constitutional methods provid.ed. for the
removal of a governor, recall and impeachment, the antiLong forces, for obvious reasons, selected the latter .

The

House thus assumed the role as a jury of indictment, to
weigh the evid.ence presented .

By

the time the impeachment

list reached the desks of the legislators, it includ.ed.
every charge under which a Louisiana governor could be
impeached, with one exception: "habitual drunkeness."

25

Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, 12£2,

PP• 27-28 .
26

Ed.1 tor1al in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March

27, 1929.

8)

The nineteen articles charged the Kingfish with the
following offensess use of his appointive power to influence
the judiciary, and boasting of that use of power; misuse,
misapplication, and misappropriation of state fund.s; bribery
and attempted bribery of state legislators; securing of
undated resignations from appointees of the Orleans Parish
Levee Board; contracting illegal loans for the state;
removal of public school officials for political purposes;
unlawful use of the mlli tia to subord.inate the civil
authority, with reference to the early 1929 raid.s on New
Orleans gambling; attempting to force parish officials to
follow his dictation in political litigation as the price
of permitting passage of legislation affecting such
parishes; habitually carrying concealed weapons; violent
abuse of officials and citizens visiting him on official
business; gross miscond.uct in public places; publicly
flouting the state and f ed.eral constitutions, and. usurping
the power of the Legislature; purchasing a $20,000 icemachine for Angola Penitentiary without advertizing for
bids; intimidating the press in the Manship affair;
demolishing the Executive Mansion without express legislattive authority and spending $150,000 for a new Mansion;
disposing of and. destroying furniture in the E:J:ecutive
Mansion without authorization or accounting; unlawfully
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paroling a convict from the state penitentiary; repeatedly
appearing within the bar of the House of Representatives in
violation of the state Constitution; and suborning murder
in attempting to hire "Battling" Bozeman to assassinate
Jared Y. Sanders, Jr. 2 7
Anti-Long forces gathered in New Orleans to set in
motion a Constitutional League, head.ed by former Governor
Parker, to "uphold the Constitution of Louisiana."

Ewing's

Daily State referred to the meeting of about three hundred
persons in the St. Charles Hotel as
the most representative gathering of citizens that
has been held. in Louisiana within a decade • • • • a
consid.erable number of business men in the meeting
announced subscriptions of $1,000 each • • • • [whenl
the subscriptions were closed., the total was estimated
at $100,000. This was done in 15 minutes.28
The duration of the special session became an issue
on April 5, 1929.

The eighteen d.ay session originally

called would end at midnight of the following day.

An

Attorney-General ruling had. established. the right of the
Legislature, as an impeachment court, but not as a lawmaking body, to remain in session. 29

Thus the supporters

2 7Lou1siana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, ill,2,
PP•

51-52.
28

News item in the Baton Rouge DailY States, June 11,

1929.
29

!.•

1928,

Opinions

2!

~April

the Attorney-General of Louisiana, May
2Q, ill.Q, pp. 188-9).
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of the

ad~inistration

raised the objection that the state

Legislature was not a court of impeachment until a charge
had been adopted and transmitted to the Senate so that
they could legally remain in session.

The House processed

the charges so slowly, however, that only the Manship press
intimidation item had been adopted favorably by April 6,
1929. 30
The timing of these actions in the House was seized
upon by Long and his nine attorneys as the basis for his
legal d.efense in the Senate.

The Kingfish 's "Exception and.

Demurrer No. 1" reasoned. that House action after the date
of adjournement specified in his call was illegal.

That is,

he recognized the Manship charge as the only legal item of
impeachment.

On May 15, the Senate rejected Long's argument

by vote: 19 yea, 20 nea.

Long's "Exception and Demurrer No.

2 11 argued that in the Manship affair he had. acted in a

personal rather than an official capacity.

The Senate, on

May 16, sustained this point on a narrow margin.3 1
The latter vote was seized. upon by the associates of
the Kingfish in the Senate to bring his trial of impeachment

30

Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session,

PP• 233.

31

Ibid., PP•

2L~5-65.

~.
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to an immediate close.

The Manship charge, the only one

voted. on before the session legally ended, was not an
impeachable offense.

Testimony further revealed that the

threat came to Manship through a reporter under circumstances which weakened its credibility.3 2 Therefore,
fifteen of the thirty-nine Senators brought forth the
celebrated Round Robin.33

The document, filed by Senator

Philip H. Gilbert, stated.:
On motion of the und.ersigned Senators of the state
of LoUisiana, and. on suggestion to this Honorable
Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, that • • • •
all charges of impeachment preferred against the said
Huey P. Long, Governor, after April 6, 1929, were
unconstitutional, illegal, null, and void • • • the
undersigned, constituting more than one-third. of the
membership of this Senate, sitting as a court of
impeachment, do now officially announce that by reason
of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of all
impeachment charges • • • will not vote against Huey
P. Long • • • [and~ we move that the Senate • • •
adjourn ~ die.JJf
Since the conviction required an absolute two-thirds
majority vote in the Senate, the anti-Longs had no choice
but to accept the Round. Robineers• motion for adjournment
~

lli_.

The Kingfish thus emerged. the victor in the

32
Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, ~.
PP• 129-34.
33The fifteen names were signed. in a circular manner
so that the order of signing could. not be determined.
34Louisiana Senate Journal, Fifth Extra Session,
!2S.2,. p. 265.
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supreme battle of his career.35
Foes of the Kingfish have never ceased to belabor the
climax of the impeachment trial as a deliberate mockery
of justice.

That view, however, overlooks the fact that

"justice" was never present, hence could not be mocked.3 6
The impeachment was politically inspired from beginning to
and and, therefore, the Round Robin was a piece with the
rest of the play.
The unbelievable sloppiness with which the forces
opposed to Long pressed their case against the Governor
was a reflection of the political nature of the impeachment.
The charges were selected indiscriminately, the hearings
were forums of personal revenge, and the entire effort
was d.i ffus ed.
The failure of the impeachment counterattack was most
costly to the conservative cause.

The Kingfish spoke

g:rimly of the future, "I used to try to get things done by
saying

1

35

please • 1 That didn't work and now I am a d.ynami ter.

Sind.ler, .2la• cit., p. 65.
36
Ibid.
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I dynamite

1

em out of my path.u37

And when the newspapers

howled at the Robineers, Long laughed. and agreed with the
press that "theirs is the earth and the fullness thereof.nJ8
Thus, the sterile trial of impeachment served to intensity
his class program.

37

Davis, ~· ~·· P• 119.
38News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July
18, 1929.

CHAPTER VI

HUEY LONG, GOVERNOR-SENATOR, 1930-1933
Long 1 s efforts to complete his program traveled. on
a rough road.

Occasionally, Long advanced a mile, then

fell back two miles.
detours.

At times he was forced into wide

The K1ngfish had. promised to be a Dyna.m1 ter.

the end he became one.

In

For at least another year, however,

he found it expedient to say an occasional "please."
There is a popular belief that the end of the hearing
for impeachment marked. the end of all organized poll tical
resistance to the Long program.

This is far from accurate.

The Kingfish remained in a precarious position for months,
but his opponents never again seriously threatened his
political existence.
Much of the K1ngf1sh 1 s uncertainty in official
affairs stemmed from the disposition of the charges against
him.

The charges were not d.ropped when the Legislature

adjourned.

Instead, they were merely shelved.

Conceivably,

although unlikely, the charges could. have been revived at
the 1930 regular legislative session.

In any event, the

K1ngfish was uneasy about their presence until much later,
when the charges against him were officially removed.
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The first evidence of the continued. antipathy toward.
the Kingfish came, as might be expected, from New Orleans.
On September 6, 1929, the Constitutional League issue a
news statement listing the names, positions, relationships,
and salaries of twenty-four persons who were supposed to be
relatives of the Governor.

Accord.ing to the League, the

relatives of the Governor were drawing $75,849.40 per year
in state sala.ries. 1
Long scoffed at the charges, saying that he had
never heard of a "ninth cousin" or a "cousin of an in-law."
He further stated that he was expecting "the League of Nations
to soon investigate the rooster at the state penitentiary to
see if the state is not feeding some of my relatives without
cbarge. 112
As usual, however, the Kingfish did not stop at
ridicule.

General Campbell Hughes had been named the

President of Louisiana State University, but he had not
formally taken office.

General Hughes• brother,however, had

been prominent in the formation of the Constitutional League.
Hence, it was wrong to employ allies, reasoned the Kingfish,
it was equally wrong to employ enemies.

The Governor

1

News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
September 7, 1929.
2

News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
September 28, 1929.
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announced a new president to replace Hodges.3
On July 18, 1929, in an open-letter to the Governor,
a comm! ttee of bankers and. 1nd.ustr1alists pet! tioned Long to
end his "political test1ng. 11

The letter continued that if

the Governor would not tm.d.ertake to establish any form of
an occupational license tax, a $20,000,000 chemical plant
would locate in the state.

The letter was signed by the

chairman of the committee, Harvey

c. Couch, President of the

Louisiana Light and. Power Company and the LoUisiana and
Arkansas Railroad..

The other signatures were penned. by

seven presidents of various banks and commercial organizations.
The Governor promised not to enact any license tax during his
term in office in exchange for business• support of an
alternative plan of taxation. 4
The New Orleans Ring was romanced ny the Governor's
hands-off policy in the January, 1930, mayorality contest

)Ibid.
4

News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July
19, 1929; and Allan P. Sind.ler, Huey Long's LoUisiana:
State Politics, 1*20-1952 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1956), p. 8.

92
between Ring captain T. Semmes Walmsley and anti-Ring Francis
Williams.
votes.

Walmsley was elected by less than ten thousand

The Governor, it was presumed, could have sw1mg five

thousand city votes one wya of the other had. he activily
intervened in the election.
To gain further favor in the Crescent City the
Governor mad.e vague hints that additional state revenue
could usefully be applied. to the $40,000,000 debt of the New
Orleans Dock Board, a state agency.
To bolster his position in the Legislature, on the
first day of the 1930 regular session, the Governor made no
mention of the controversial tick-eradication problem and, by
strategic maneuvering, placed the problem of securing ad.d.itional state revenues in the laps of the Solons.
dent

~

For Presi-

Tempore of the Senate, the Kingfish backed. the

candidacy of a Senator who had voted. in favor of his impeachment in one of the two votes and who had. not been one of
the Ro bineers. 5
The Kingfish 1 s concessions reaped. a meager reward.
Longites, reduced from its majority proportions in 1929,
faced anti-Long forces who remained sufficiently numerous
and cohesive to prod.uce a stalmated session.

The factional

5News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 12,
1930; and. Louisiana Senate Journal, .!.2.2.Q (Baton Rouge:1930),
PP• L~-5.
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alignment of the lawmakers was made evid.ent at the beginning
of the 1930 regular session of the Legislature. 6 Fortyfour of the one-hundred. state Representatives supported a
motion to reorganize the House which has as its ultimate
purpose the outser of John B. Fournet from the spea.kership.?
Alvin

o.

King, of Lake Charles, replaced. Robineer Philip

H. Gilbert as President Pro Tempore of the Senate. 8

A few days before the opening of the May 11, 1930,
regular session, the Governor had created. a tempest when he
had hinted that he might run for the United States Senate.9
According to the Governor:
I am practically sure I'm going to run but I
won't if I have to let that good friend of mine, the
Lieutenant-Governor, get the office. I love ~ m too
much to impose the duties of Governor on him. 0
The influencial Times-Picayune, which continued. to

1930.

~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayupe, May 12,
?Louisiana House Journal, .!.2lQ (Baton Rouge:

1930),

PP• 14-15.
8Louisiana Senate Journal, 1930. pp. L~-5.
9By the Constitution of 1921, the Governor could not
succeed himself. Long had almost two years remaining in his
term. The law has since been amended.•
10News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 5.
1930.
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serve as a vocal agent for the renewal of the impeachment
proceed.ings, leveled. the charge that Long was "bluffing"
about running for the Senate and that the hint was made as a
strategic move to win legislative support. 11 Due to Long's
unstable position in the Legislature, however, the Governor's
announcement was received with little notice by the state's
lawmakers.
The technique of mass appeal via circulars, initially
used by the Kingfish when campaigning for his first office,
had also been successfully employed to gain public support
during his impeachment fight.

Thus, with d,ecisi ve poll tical

battles plainly in sight and. with every major newspaper in
the state against him, the Kingfish established. his own
newspaper.
~

On Thursday, March 27, 1930, the first issue of

Louisiana Progress appeared..
To get

~

Louisiana Progress rolling, the Governor

hired Trist Wood., a famous Louisiana political-cartoonist,
and set up the newspaper plant just across the state line
in Mississippi.

The Progress served. a double purpose.

It

would saturate the public with the Kingfish's accounts of
programs in public works and. construction; it would also
11
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May
5, 1930.
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magnify his opponents• shortcomings, drench them with a steady
stream of adverse personal publicity and, where possible,
ridicule their achievements. 12 The Progress always featured
cartoons by Trist Wood. pictorializing the opponents of the
Kingfish as snakes and. buzzards.

11

Trist, 11 as he signed him-

self, portrayed the major New Orleans newspapers as grotesquelooking characters who told lies and nothing but lies.
Constitutional League was a favorite of Trist•s pen.

The
The

League was characterized as a balky little mule carrying a
group of broken-down politicians.
From the standpoint of circulation and financial
stability, the Progress was an immed.iate success.

As Long

recorded., "Our friend.s throughout the state voluntarily
solicited subscriptions 1 J for the Progress. We began to
make life merry for our enemies with cartoon, statistics,
and comparisons. 1114

Getting the paper to its readers was

never a problem, according to one of Long's most critical
12
Long, .QR• ill·· pp. 188-93; Martin, ~· cit., pp. 7475; ans Sind.ler, 2.12.• ill•, 70-71.
13
The Progress sold for five cents per issue or for
two dollars for a one-year subscription.
1l~

Long, £2• cit., pp. 188-89.
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biographers,
Squads of them [state policemen 1, assisted. by the
ublqutous highway crews, gave th~ paper the most
unique circulation organ1zat1on.l5
~

Louisiana Progress began as a weekly, but the

frequency of the paper's appearance was almost a barometer
of the K1ngf1sh 1 s political fortune.
oppo~ents

1

An increase in his

act! vi ties spelled. an increase in publication.

The most controversial item of the regular session
was the Governor's "good roads measure," a $60,000,000 highway bond issue, which by necessity was submitted. in the form
of a constitutional amendment.

The measure was never able

to secure the absolute two-thirds majority vote in each
chamber which was required for its passage.

The Governor

was able to holdback a host of opposition measures through
outright legislative rejection, insertion of weakening
amendments, or gubernatorial vetoes.

The Governor vetoed

four major bills: $6,400 for "additional expenses for the
Lieutenant-Governor while acting Governor;" a similar amount
for the Attorney-General, who was "acting counsel" for the
Constitutional League; 16 a $100,000 appropriation to pay
15
Martin, ~· cit . , p. 74.
16
Long, ~· cit., 210.
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the cost of the impeachment proceedings; and the popular
tick-eradication bill. 1 7
On the last clay alloted for bills to be entered. on
the legislative calendar, the administration introduced. a
measure calling for a constitutional convention. 18 The bill,
however, was at the bottom of a congested. calendar and was
further hampered by a delaying tactic employed by the enemies
of the administration.

Representative Allen Ellender moved

that the procedural rules be changed so that the convention
bill could be considered out of its regular order. 1 9 A
compromise, however, left the measure for a convention in its
normal position with a pledge from the opposition that it
would stop its delaying action. 20 The measure calling for
a convention passed the House by a narrow margin: six votes. 21

17

Typical of his poll tical ad.roi tness was his
approval of the legislatively-sponsored measure providing
for a tick-eradication program, followed by his veto of a
companion appropriation bill. Long felt that while the
state remained 11 open range," such a law was unworkable.
18
Louisiana House Journal, 1_23__Q, p • .397; and. the
Louisiana Senate Journal, IDQ., pp:-]24-25.

19

Allen J. Ellender, at the time of this writing, 1s
the senior United States Senator from Louisiana. The junior
Senator is Russell B. Long.
20
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 20,
19.30.
21
Louisiana House Journal, ill.Q, pp. 646-47.
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The indi vid.ua.ls opposed, to the convention continued
their efforts to kill the bill.

The Times-Picayune sent a

wire to Lieutenant-Governor Cyr urging him to aid in the
22
bill's defeat.
&litorially, that newspaper also leveled
an attack on the measure:
While pretending to limit constitutional change to
three subjects, the bill in facts permits the complete
rewritting of the Constitution, it is revolution entire.
It does this by providing for submission of the
convention's work to the approval of the voters. Thus
the constitutional convention demanded by the Governor
is a wide open convention.23
Most sources agree with Long's own version of what
transpired in the Senate:
When our bill for Constitutional Convention reached
the Senate, a. well-designed. filibuster was organized. to
be carried. out largely through the cond.uct of the
Lieutenant-Governor. At the beginning of every morning
session, some opposition Senator rose to a point of
personal privilege and. spoke throughout the d.ay. 2LJ.
No member of the Senate, not a party to the plot,
could. secure recognition from the presiding officer, the
Lieutenant-Governor.

The filibuster continued for days,

until Long conclud,ed that his position would best be served
22

News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July
4 and. 5. 1930.
23
Editorial in the New Orleans Times-Picazune, June
21, 1930.
24
Long, 2.E.• ill·· 206-07.
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by having the session end in filibuster. 25
When the 1930 regular legislative session ended, it
was evident that Louisiana finances "had come to a standstill."

The appropriations for all state agencies had been

reduced and. no new revenue-producing measures had. been
enacted to relieve the situation in the future.

However,

by holding the Governor to a stalemate in the Legislature,
the anti-administration forces inadvertently encouraged him
to carry his case d.irectly to the people. 26
On July 17, 1930, a week after the Legislature
ad.journed, the Governor made an official announcement, via
The Louisiana Progress, that he would oppose the incumbent,
United States Senator Joseph E. Ransdell, 27 a veteran of
thirty-two years of Congressional office.

The sole issue of

the campaign, as he saw it was the program which had been
killed by the Legislature.

The Kingfish further stated that

if a "majority of people, voting in this Senatorial contest,
do not cast their vote in my favor then I am willing to admit
that the people do not want the program which I have en-

25

Long, £E•

26

1.:2!£.,

27

£!!••

p. 207.

p. 211.

The Governor scathingly referred to the goateed
Senator Ransdell as "old Feather Duster."
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dorsed. tt

He also repeated an earlier announcement that due

to the riff with the Lieutenant-Governor, he would not leave
the state until his gubernatorial term expired.. 28 There
were hurried protests that Louisiana Senatorial representation would. suffer, but Long brushed. the objections aside by
saying that "with Ransdell as Senator, the seat was vacant
anyway.n29
As Long recorded in his autobiography, Every
King, ttit was the battle of Louisiana's history.

~ ~

For once

the public press was united.--all against me.n3°
The Kingfish introduced. novel campaign methods into
the Senatorial race. He hired two "gaugy, expensive sound.
trucksu3 1 to spread the Long message across the state. The
trucks became, in Long's own word.s, "the first portable
appliance • • • ever used in a political campaign.u3 2 He

28

News item in The Louisiana Progress , July 17, 1930.

29
Long, £E•

£!!., p. 213.

30

!lli.·

31

Reinhard. H. Luthin, American Demagogues: Twentieth
Century (Gloucester, Mass .: Peter Smith, 1959), p. 251.
32
Long, 2E• cit., p. 220.
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began a baby-sitter service to be used. at outdoor rallies.
The Kingfish also made frequent use of the tool that was
soon to become his major device for spreading his plans to
Share Our Wealth:

radio.

His broadcasts always began the

same way:
This is Huey P. Long talking, but I 1 m not going to
say anything important for the next few minutes so you
can go to the telephone and call up four or five of your
friends and tell them to tune in too.
Long waited almost until August to shift his campaign
into high gear.

Senator Ransdell had proceeded him, moving

from one parish seat to another, conducting his campaign in
the "courtly, restrained manner of trad.i tional southern
politicians.u33

Ransdell was virtually helpless against

the Governor's parish-saturation technique.

The voters

were seeking a newer and. fresher figure for public life.
To many of them the goateed, seventy-two year old Senator,
stilted and formal, had become a shopworn political type.J4
At St. Martinsville, St. Martin Parish, the Governor,
in his first major speech, repeated his claim that the "main
issue" of the Senatorial race was the endorsement of his
general works and state highway construction programs.

JJMartin, 2£•

4

3 Luthin, 2£•

£11••

P• 77•

£!!••

P• 252.

He
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recounted. his free textbook battle and deno1mced goateed
"old. trashy mouth11 Ransd.ell for his aid. to the "predatory
interests and Wall Street in sending our young men in[to]
Nicaragua, Venezula, and Honduras."

Long inadvertently

introduced the race issue with a statement of opposition
to the appointment of John J. Parker, of Norht Carolina, to
the United States Supreme Court.3S

The speech concluded

with a pledge to support the farm relief program that the
seventy-two year old Senator opposed. ind.ependence for the
Philippines, the abandonment of the differential tariff on
Cuban sugar, and "freedom from foreign entanglements.n36
In mid-July two other LoUisiana notables, Frank L.
Looney, a Shreveport attorney, and August Williams, a
former Longite, entered the Senatorial race.

Williams, who

did not believe "any thing should. be allowed to stand in the

35Senator Ransdell had. backed the appointment of
Judge John J. Parker to the United. States Supreme Court.
To organized labor, Parker represented the "yellow dog"
contract. Accord.ingly, Ransdell was rejected by the
LoUisiana Federation of Labor. In d.efense, Ransdell held
that the National Association for the Ad.vancement of Colored
People had opposed. Parker, and his pro-Parker stand had. been
cond.i tioned by racial, not anti-labor consid.erations.
Therefore, continued. Ransdell, Long's attack on his support
of Parker ind.icated. that Long favored racial equality.
)6

News item in the LoUisiana Progress, August 7,

19)0.
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way of accomplishing the defeat of Long,tt37

withd.rew early.

On August 9, 1930, Looney withdrew from the contest to
11 back Ransd.ell. u3 8
With the campaign narrowed to only two,
State Senator William c. Boone framed. the race between Long
and. Ransd.ell as a choice between "honest or dishonest
government in Louisiana. "39
The opposition chose Huey P. Long
campaign issue.
apoligized.

~or

Colonel Sullivan, of the

himsel~
11

as the

new11 Ring,

having previously backed Long and predicted

that if Long was elected, he would not be seated..

The

Colonel, who was soon joined by J. Y. Sanders, Sr., of the
Ring, and August Williams, 40 stated. that:
Jesse James was a gentleman compared with Long, because
Jesse James at least wore a mask. Long has the face of
a clown, the heart of a Rfi'tty larceny burglar and the
disposition of a tyrant. 1
At a New Orleans rally for Ransdell, Joseph A.

37

News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica;rune, July

29, 1930.
38
News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica;r1me,
August 10, 1930.

39

News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica;rune,
August 11, 1930.
40
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picazune,
August 24-26, 1930.
41
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 23, 1930.
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Finnerman denounced Long as a "false friend of labor, u 42
although a few days earlier William Green, President of the
American Federation of Labor, had personally endorsed Long
in a letter to ~LoUisiana Progress.43
The press of the state was led. by the Times-Picayune
in its assault on Long.

Banner-line stories accused the

Governor of forcing all state employees to make a "voluntary
contributiontt of one-tenth of one month's salary to fill his
campaign chests, 44 and. using prison labor "to the exclusion
of free labor in the painting of auto tire covers" publicizing his cand.id.acy. ~5

1

Even the venerable N2 ~ Times

hoped not to see Long "transfer his political methods and his
personality to the floor of the already suffering Senate. 1146
The claim by Walter B. Hamlin, a New Orleans attorney,
is typical of the position maintained by the anti-Long camp:
11

The real issue is Huey P. Long, his political debauchery
L~2

News item
August 20, 1930.
43
News item
44
News item
August 8, 1930.
45
News item
August 29, 1930.
46
News item

in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
in

~Louisiana

Progress, July 31, 1930.

in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
in the New Orleans Times-Picazune,
1n the

~~Times,

August 31, 1930.
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and corrupt! ve influence in Louisiana politics • 114·7
In the final d.ays of the campaign, Long fired a final
shot at "concentrated. wealth."

The Wall Street capitalists,

said Long,
must be made to realize that they cannot go on piling
up millions and millions of dollars. They may call it
[Long's criticism] socialism, but let them disown me.
Every law th~t isn • t for capitalist is always called.
socialistic.q,8
Lieutenant-Governor Paul Cyr, fiercely anti-Long,
provided the backdrop for election week.

Cyr announced.

that the Constitution of 1921 prohibited. a state official
from holding a fed.eral office:
If Long should be elected. Senator, he will either
have to resign his seat in the Senate, or will cease
to be governor of Louisiana.49
Lieutenant-Governor Cyr, continuing his broadsid.e, accused
Long of attempting to get out of the state before the crash
that
is bound. to come as a result of the financial situation
to which his extravagant and. corrupt administration has
brought the schools and institutions of the state.50
47News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 31, 1930.
48
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 30, 1930.
49
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 27, 1930.

50

News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
August 28, 1930.
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In the September primary, Long steamrolled. Ransdell
in every section of the state.

Even in st. Bernard. Parish,

the scene of the raids on gambling by militia men, Long
scored an astonishing victory--Long: 3,970, Ransdell: 9.
The vote would suggest a solid endorsement of the Long
program by the people of Louisiana, as shown in the following
results:51

%State

State

Orleans

Other

Long

38,682

110,958

149,640

57·3

Ransd.ell

43.373

68,078

114,511

L~2. 7

Total

82,055

179,036

261,091

A comparison of the above table with the table on
page 43 shows that the Governor increased his proportion
of the total state vote from 43.9 per cent in 1928 to 57·3
per cent in 1930.

It should be noted, however, that the

total vote cast in 1930 declined. 27,824 from that of 1928.
Most of the decreased. turnout came from parishes other than
Orleans.

Long was backed by approximately the same number

of voters outside Orleans Parish in 1928 (109,023) and in
1930 (110,958).

At the same time, he more than d.oubled his

number of allies in Orleans Parish in 1930

(L~7

per cent)

compared with that of 1928 (23 per cent).
51 Computed from Compilation of Primary Election
Returns 2! the Democratic Party, State 2! Louisiana, held
September 9, 1930.
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Comparison of Figure 2, page 16, Figure 3. page 44,
and. Figure 4. page 108 lead.s to the conclusion that elements
of continuity were superimposed on those of change.

In 1930

as in 1928, Long possessed relatively greater strength in
the old Populist strongholds, and. relative weakness in the
Delta, the Sugar Bowl, and. the urban areas.
Peace doves, an almost extinct species, appeared in
Louisiana shortly after the Senatorial primary.

Long's

victory at the polls broke the factional stalemate in the
state.

It was commonly held that all measures should be

passed backing his ttgood. roads" project.

Although there

were some d.ie-hard.s, such as Representative Gilbert Dupre,
of Opelousas, who had. earlier accused. the Governor of
"spending state money in a whore house,u5 2 and who also
maintained:
The Legislature may ratify what they [Longites] propose,
the people confirm it, but I am going to be dismissed
from the bargain. I am going to vote No, ev~n if I
am the only member of the House to d.o this .5J
The vogue, however, was away from Representative

52

Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session,
(Baton Rouge: 1929), p. 97.
53
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
September 17, 1930.

~.

i

0
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Dupre's opposition.
gnat-~ly

The day following the primary, the

of the administration, the Constitutional League,

issued. a terse announcement: It was disband.ed • .54

The same

d.ay, Mayor T. Semmes Walmsley, the Ring standard-bearer,
appeared at Long's suite in New Orleans with a delegation
o~ civic leaders to congratulate the Senator-elect.55

A special legislative session
called immediately

a~ter

the primary.

o~

eight days was

The Ring struck a

bargain with the Governor which committed. it to back a
constitutional amendment, to be voted on by the people of
the state in November, for $?5 ,000,000 in new highway bonds;
a $5,000,000 bond issue

~or

a new skyscraper state capitol

building; a one-cent increase in the tax on gasoline; and
withdrawal of the 1929 impeachment charges.

In return,

Long endorsed a plan to set aside one-half of the revenue
from the gasoline tax increase to bolster the Port of New
Orleans' sagging credit; a bond issue
airport; $?, 000, 000

o~

the road. bond.

~or

~und.s

a New Orleans
orr construction

of a free bridge across the Mississippi River at New Orleans;
and funds ~or an intercoastal waterway.5 6 All measures

.54Long, .Q2• .2ll· t p. 235.

55News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
September 22, 1930.

56News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
September 23, 1930.
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were passed.57
The ease in which Long's program was enacted, however,
should. not overshadow the fact that Representative Dupre was
far from being the only Solon to oppose the Kingfish.

In

spite of the margin of victory in the Senatorial primary
and the entente between the Governor and the Ring, twenty-one
of the one-hundred members of the House opposed the motion
by Repz·esentati ve Allen J. Ellend.er to wi thd.raw the charges
of impeachment against the Governor.

Further, the Times-

Picayune, although less hostile, editorially warned that due
to the amount of control given Long, he would. personally be
responsible for the political future of the state.58
By 1931 the dominance of the Long forces in the state
was evid.ent.

The barometer of Long • s success,

~

Louisiana

Progress, a weekly at the beginning, after the acceptance of
the constitutional amendments in November, 1930, converted
to a monthly publication.
After the Senatorial primary, Long did not leave the
state for fear that Cyr would seize power.

Cyr, aided by

various anti-Long! tes, had. never ceased. to insist upon the
57
Acts, State of LoUisiana, Regular Session, !2J£,
EXtra SesSIOns, 12lQ and !2J£ (Baton Rouge: 1932), pp. 533. 3941 t 45::1.~7' 57-58.

58

Editorial in the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
November 5, 1930.

111
unconstitutionality of Long's dual role as Governor and
United States Senator-elect.

On October 13, 1931, Paul Cyr

announced that since Long "could not possibly be governor"
that he, Paul Cyr had been sworn in as the Governor of the
state by a notary public in Shreveport.

He further stated

that the temporary "capitol" was now the Heidelberg Hotel.59
Cyr later moved the "capitol" to his home in Jeaneratte.
became a laughing stock.

He

Throughout Louisiana wags sought

out notaries public so that they also could be sworn in as
Governor of Louisiana. 60
Long, however, upstaged even Cyr's performance.

He

announced that if Cyr had taken the oath as Governor be
was, therefore, no longer Lieutenant-Governor.

Long swore

in the President pro tempore of the Senate, Alvin 0. King,
as Lieutenant-Governor, and had the state payroll so
adjusted. 61
59Long, 2£• £1i•• pp. 287-88; Martin , 2£• £!!.,
PP• 86-88; Optowsky, 22• £1!•, pp. 57-58; and the New
Orleans Times-Picayune, October 13-27, 1931.
60
Although Long went along with the various gags and
pranks during the "Governors' Battle ," the Secretary of
State, Alice Lee Grosjean, d.id not accept any of the joke
credentials.
61
The same month that Long left Louisiana to claim
his Senate seat, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a 4-J
decision, maintained that it lacked jurisdiction in the Cyr
case and the United States Senate was the proper body to
determine the date on which Long qualified as a Senator.
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To keep in operation the program started during his
administration , Long announced his ucomplete the Work 11
ticket:

for Governor , state Highway Commissioner

o.

K. Allen ,

of Winn Parish , a boyhood friend; for Lieutenant-Governor,
Speaker of the House Fournet of Bloody Monday fame during
the 1929 impeachment battle . 62
A south Louisiana Catholic , Dudley J. LeBlanc , headed.
the ticket which provided the major anti-Long force in the
1932 campaign, although Earl Long , Huey ' s younger brother ,
ran for Lieutenant-Governor on the ticket of George
Guion . 63

s.

The outcome of the January 9 , 1932, primary was a
victory for Longism .

Allen's entire nine-man ticket won

office with him .
Long remained in the state only long enough to
observe the victory of

o.

K. Allen as Governor-elect .

On

January 25 , 1932 , with Alvin King as Governor, United States
Senator Huey P . Long left Louisiana by train for Washington ,

n. c.
6

1931.

~ews item in the Louisiana Progress , November 10 ,

63Two minor gubernatorial candidates , William Boone,
and. William Clark , received. a combined total vote of 1 , 346 .

CHAPTEB VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Before Huey Long entered LoUisiana politics, so the
folklore goes, the voters had no choice.

As Long liked to

say, Louisiana had been suffering from the Tweedled.um and.
Tweed.ledee administrations: "One of them skinned you from
the ankles up, the other from the neck down ." 1 Since Huey
Long, the people of the state have had the choice between a
venal administration with a d.ynamic platform, or an honest
corporation-puppet

ad~inistration.

Like most popular myths,

these ideas are tempered by exaggeration; yet as popular
myths often d.o, they contain an element of truth. 2
I.

SUMMARY

In the years following Reconstruction , the positions
of power in Louisiana were assumed by a hierarchy representing the upper-income groups: the old. plantation class
and. the new and. rising business interests.

By the turn of

1

Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hafride: The American
Rehersal !!2.£ Dictatorshi}, 192B-19Lt·ONew York: William
Morrow and Company, 1940 • p. 62.
2

v.

0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics 1n
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 1610~.

State~

Nation
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the century, all business factions were dwarfed by Standard
Oil Company .
The Bing, New Orleans ' Democratic machine, and. the
Standard Oil Company usually emerged as the victors in the
running battle between the Crescent City and the rural
parishes.

Influenced by the oil interest, the Ring moved

the state into a civic vacuum with its ttsafen policies.
The dominant influence of the Ring in state politics
continued the trad.ition of upper- class rule . 3
Huey Pierce Long, Jr . , was born in Winn Parish in
1893 , the seventh of nine child.ren .

Winn Parish, with its

thin red soil and. cutover loblolly pine patches, was poor
in comparison with the more favored. sugar and. cotton
parishes.

However, the Longs were not "white trash, 11 they

were middle-class farmers , with a respect for education and
a strong desire to acquire it .

After incomplete legal

training at Oklahoma State University and Tulane Law School,
Long passed a special bar examination and , at twenty-one,
was licensed to practice law.

Following an unprofitable law

practice in Winnfield , specializing in industrial compensa-

3Readers who regard classes as fictions and disagree
with this writer ' s interpretation of them may nevertheless
discover some interesting interpretations of a general
nature in this chapter . While local Louisiana history has
been examined. in terms of classes , the author has avoided
treating them from a purely Marxian point of view since
there was not sufficient evidence to justify it.
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tion, Long sought the one state office open to him:
District Railroad Commissioner.

Third.

In the runoff, Long won by

a narrow margin.
Having achieved statewide fame through his battles
with the Standard Oil Company and a series of strategic
rate cases, Long entered the

1921~

gubernatorial primary.

However, the state was d.i vided by a religious conflict
which was instrumental in bringing about Long's d.efeat.
In 1928, when Long again filed for LoUisiana's
highest elective office, neither of his opponents, singly,
represented a threat to his chances of victory.

Under the

campaign banner Every Man a King , Long presented. a platform
advocating free textbooks, free bridges, a vast highway
construction program, natural gas for the larger cities, and
the enactment of an occupational license tax on the Stand.ard.
Oil Company.
Although Long received only 43·9 per cent of the
total vote cast, his opponents withdrew from the race,
eliminating the need for a runoff, and Long was nominated
as the Democratic candidate for Governor of Louisiana.
It took Long several years to achieve his goals due
to the implacable opposition of the upper-classes.

Eight

months after his inauguration as governor and the announcement of his principle legislative demands, an attempt was
made to impeach him.

Long narrowly defeated the move by
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securing a document, signed. by a sufficient number of Senators
to block a vote for conviction, declaring the proceedings
unconstitutional.
The termination of the impeachment hearings did. not
mark the end of organized political resistance to the Long
program.

The charges against the Governor were merely

shelved and., conceivably, could have been renewed..

The

uncertain position of the Governor resulted in a legislative
stalemate in 1930.
With two years remaining in his administration, Long
announced his Senatorial candidacy, making the endorsement
of his gubernatorial program the issue of the campaign, and
pledging not to leave the state, if elected, until his term
as governor had expired.
Long's triumph in the Senatorial primary broke the
factional deadlock in the state Legislature.

Following the

Senatorial primary, the Legislature, in special session,
enacted. a major portion of the Long program, although there
still existed. considerable political resistance.
A few months before departing for Washington to claim
his Senatorial seat, Governor Long announced. a Complete the
Work slate, listing cand.id.ates he endorsed. for the nine
major offices of the state.

The entire ticket was approved

by the voters of Louisiana in the 1932 Democratic primary.
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II.

CONCLUSIONS

The popular view of Huey P. Long, such as that
presented by R. H. Luthin in American Demagogues: Twentieth
Century, dismisses him as little else but a highly successful member of the family of southern poor-white leaders
commonly termed. demagogues.

The term

11

d emagogue 11 usually

refers to a professional "man of the people,tt one who
proposes quack remedies insincerely for political or personal
gains.

To tm.cover a d.emagogue, the observer is to pay

particular attention to irrational appeals, attempts to sway
emotions, and. attention-getting tomfoolery. 4 However, such
criteria are inadequate and mislead.ing and. have made of the
term a subjective epithet to be used with politicians one
dislikes.

t-lhether one is to be classified a demagogue or a

statesman seems quite often to depend upon the respectability
of one's followers and. upon the agencies of propaganda which
oppose one.

Thus, the validity of many charges of personal

corruption leveled against Huey Long, while highly relevant
to an interpretation of his record, for obvious reasons is
4

Reinhard H. Luth!n, American Demagogues: Twentieth
Century (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), pp. 302-19.
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impossible to determine on the single basis of public
information.
As

w.

J . Cash , in The Mind

of~

South, was probably

the first to note , Huey Long was the first southern leader
to overwhelm the established. machine (the Ring] and bring
it to terms . 5

In the words of

v. o.

Key , Jr .:

He did not permit himself , in the oft-repeated. pattern ,
to be hamstrung by a legislature dominated by old hands
experienced. in legislation and. frequently under corporation retainer . He elected his legislgture and erected.
a structure of political power • • • •
However , Carlton Beals , 1n

~

Story

2f.

Huey P.

Long , wrote:
his methods were inevitable, and in themselves not
reprehensible . No intelligent critic should attack Huey
Long too much fo~: the manner in which he smashed the
die- hard clique . ·1
And even Francis Butler Simkins , who framed Long
as another Hitler or Mussolini , 8 stated that:
perhaps the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century
was not that such men (as Long] were so popular, but
that the administration they aroused was not altogether

5

w. J . Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 19LJ.2), pp . 28LI·:s:5:" - 6
v. 0 . Key , Jr ., .2E• cit ., P • 157 .
7
Carlton Beals, ~Story 2!, Huey 1?_ . L}ng
(Philadelphia : H. B. Lippencott Company, 1935 , p . 20 .
8
Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961). p . -.546.
- -
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'lmderstood.9
If Huey Long had merely created an efficient personal
machine, his accomplishment, while noteworthy, would not
have afforded him the attention he attracted in his own
life or entitled him to the unique place he has in the
annals of American politics.

By keeping faith with his

voters while Governor, Long provoked a rural lower-class
revolution which exceeded that of Populism in durability
and intensity.

It aroused the political have-nots and

showed them the total victory that was theirs for the
balloting.

By overcoming the appeals of localism and

personality common to the one-party state, the revolution
moved. the state into close approximation to a two-party
system with the major parties Long and anti-Long.

9Francis Butler Simkins, The South: Old and New
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19L~7}, p. 1~39.- -
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